Miscellaneous Models
In this chapter I will deal with models, which are difficult to fit within any of the categories discussed above.
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Suren Basov
Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts
Studies in Economic Theory Volume 30
Founded by: Charalambos D. Aliprantis Series editors Nicholas C. Yannelis, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA Timothy J. Kehoe, University of Minnesota and Federal Reserve Bank of Menneapolis, Minneapolis, MN, USA Bernard Cornet, Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1, Paris, France and University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, USA
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/2584
Suren Basov
Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts
123
Suren Basov Centre for Economics and Financial Econometrics Research Deakin University Burwood, VIC Australia
ISSN 1431-8849 Studies in Economic Theory ISBN 978-981-10-1039-2 DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5
ISSN 2196-9930
(electronic)
ISBN 978-981-10-1041-5
(eBook)
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016938658 © Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Printed on acid-free paper This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer Science+Business Media Singapore Pte Ltd.
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 11
2 Ambiguity, Robustness, and Contract Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 A Model of Ambiguity Aversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Equilibrium Theory and Ambiguity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Ambiguity Aversion and the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem . 2.4 Ambiguity Aversion, Moral Hazard, and Contractual Incompleteness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Some Other Economic Effects of Pessimism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.1 Robustness and Linear Contracts: Uncertainty Over Agent’s Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.
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