Missing, Presumed Not Dead
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Missing, Presumed Not Dead Samuel Lebens 1 Received: 1 May 2020 / Revised: 1 September 2020 / Accepted: 7 September 2020 # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract In this paper, I argue that if we have reason to believe that an immaterial soul exists, then (absent evidence to the contrary) it should be presumed to be immortal. The conclusion is weaker than Socrates’ conclusion that immaterial souls must be immortal, but the argument is stronger, I claim, for having this weaker conclusion. Moreover, a presumption of immortality is significant in its own right. Keywords Death . Afterlife . Souls . Socrates
Socrates had a number of arguments for the immortality of the soul. Less ambitious than Socrates, I don’t argue that immaterial souls exist, nor do I argue that if they exist, they must be immortal. Instead, I argue that if they exist, we should at least presume them to be immortal. A presumption of immortality is, whilst less striking than a castiron assurance, philosophically significant. The argument runs as follows: 1. Mereological simples are not subject to entropy 2. For any x and any time, t, if x exists at t, and x isn’t subject to entropy, then for any later time, tn, we have reason to presume that x exists at tn 3. If we have reason to believe that x exists, but no theoretical reason to posit mereological complexity in x, we should presume that x is simple 4. If immaterial souls exist, we have no theoretical reason for positing mereological complexity in them 5. If immaterial souls exist, and if we have reason to believe that they exist, then we should presume that they are mereologically simple (from 3 and 4) 6. If immaterial souls exist, and if we have reason to believe that they exist, then we should presume that they are not subject to entropy (from 1 and 5) * Samuel Lebens [email protected]
1
University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
Philosophia
7. For any x and any time, t, if x is an immaterial soul, and x exists at t, and we have reason to believe this, then we should presume that, for any later time, tn, we have reason to presume that x exists at tn (from 2 and 6) In other words, line 7 tells us that if there are immaterial souls, we should presume that we should presume that they are immortal. As far as I’m concerned, 7 is already a pretty strong conclusion, but we can strengthen it on the following assumption: The Presumption Assumption: if you should presume that you should presume that p, you should simply presume that p.1 If so, 7 entails: 8. If x is an immaterial soul, and you have reason to believe that it exists, then you should presume that x is immortal2 The argument is valid. So, if premises 1–4 are true, then the argument (at least for 7, if not for 8) will also be sound. In what follows, I present reasons for adopting all four premises. The truth of premise 1 is easy to establish. Its justification needn’t detain us long, nor will it require that we take a stance on exactly what entropy is. So long as entropy is a measure of the molecular disorder, or the randomness, of a system (
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