Modern orthodoxy and morality: an uneasy partnership
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Modern orthodoxy and morality: an uneasy partnership Daniel Statman1 Received: 5 June 2019 / Accepted: 4 February 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Modern orthodoxy often perceives itself and is perceived by others as a movement which grants more importance to moral considerations in its interpretation of halakha and in its general worldview than does the ultra-orthodox movement. Accordingly, modern orthodox rabbis are often referred to as more “moderate” than their ultra-orthodox counterparts, a term which seems to imply that they are more open to moral arguments and more likely to adopt, or to develop, moral interpretations of halakha. A study of some central figures like Walter Wurzburger, Eliezer Berkovits and Joseph B. Soloveitchick, however, indicates that the modern orthodox approach to morality is much more ambivalent. The purpose of this paper is to discuss this ambivalence and to speculate on its source. Keywords Jewish ethics · Modern orthodoxy · Euthyphro dilemma · Soloveichik · Leibowitz
Introduction The Euthyphro dilemma as understood in contemporary philosophy forces a dilemma between two assumingly exclusive and exhaustive horns; either, in some sense, the validity of morality depends on God or it is independent of God. Those who opt for the former subscribe to “divine command morality.” In their view, if God did not exist, or if He had issued different commands than He actually did, there would have been no moral requirements—or they would have been different from what they actually are. For those who subscribe to the latter view, a world without God would include more or less the same moral requirements and values as the actual world (which is assumed by both camps to include God). Elsewhere1 it has been shown that while in both Muslim and Christian traditions it is possible to identify prominent thinkers who hold the view that morality depends 1
See Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman, “Divine Command Morality and the Jewish Tradition,” Journal of Religious Ethics 23 (1995): 49–68. * Daniel Statman [email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel
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on God’s will, such a view is almost completely absent in the Jewish tradition. Given the religious appeal of this view and the historical influences of these two traditions on Judaism, this finding is surprising and meaningful. It seems to say something about the unique value ascribed to the ethical in the Jewish tradition. If God does not determine morality then, in a sense, He too is subject to its requirements, as indicated in familiar sources in both the Hebrew Bible and in the Talmud.2 If God commands X because of X’s intrinsic value, that would seem to entail a worldview in which believers are advised to seek moral guidance when seeking normative guidance instead of consulting religious law which becomes redundant in the sphere of morality. (That was, of course, Plato’s original point in posing the dilemma: If the gods
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