Modifying the reason model

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Modifying the reason model John Horty1 Accepted: 31 August 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020

Abstract In previous work, I showed how the “reason model” of precedential constraint could naturally be generalized from the standard setting in which it was first developed to a richer setting in which dimensional information is represented as well. Surprisingly, it then turned out that, in this new dimensional setting, the reason model of constraint collapsed into the “result model,” which supports only a fortiori reasoning. The purpose of this note is to suggest a modification of the reason model of constraint that distinguishes it from the result model even in the dimensional setting. Keywords Precedent · Constraint · Dimensions

1 Introduction In previous work (Horty 2019), I showed how two models of precedential constraint could be generalized from the standard setting in which they were first developed, allowing only CATO-style (Aleven 1997) legal factors, to a richer setting in which dimensional information can be represented as well. The first of these was the result model of constraint, supporting only a fortiori reasoning. The second was the reason model, supporting a stronger notion of precedential constraint that allows the reasons behind decisions to be taken into account. These two models lead to distinct notions of constraint in the standard setting, but as shown in Horty (2019), in the context of the dimensional setting, the reason model collapses into the result model, leading to exactly the same notion of constraint. Although surprised by this result, I was willing to accept it, and explored what might be characterized as “pragmatic” means of differentiating the two models, rather than altering the definition of the reason model itself. A number of others, however— especially Bench-Capon and Atkinson (2017a, b, 2018) and Rigoni (2018)—criticized this approach, arguing that the collapse of the reason model into the result model shows

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John Horty [email protected] Philosophy Department and Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA

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J. Horty

that the reason model itself must be modified, and mapping out alternative approaches of their own. I still think there is something to be said for the original definition of the reason model.1 But I also think the criticisms of Atkinson, Bench-Capon, Rigoni and others show that the results of this original definition are, at time, sufficiently unintuitive that modifications should be considered. The purpose of this note is to propose what I take to be, if not the right modification, then at least the modification that is most in keeping with the motivation underlying the original definition. Organization: Sect. 2 reviews basic concepts from the dimensional setting. Section 3 presents the original definition of the reason model within this setting, and Sect. 4 presents my proposed modification.2

2 Basic concepts and notation In contrast to a factor, which can be defined as a legally significant proposition that