Moral Conflict and Political Obligation in (Highly) Non-ideal Conditions
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Moral Conflict and Political Obligation in (Highly) Non‑ideal Conditions Allyn Fives1 · Kei Hiruta2
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Moral conflict is an unavoidable feature of political life. And moral conflicts arise for a number of diverse reasons and in a variety of social and political contexts. We may be required to do incompatible things by different moral values, or by different conceptions of the same value, or by the values of different cultural forms and social structures (Gray 2013 [1996]). But in each case, we have reason to ϕ, we have reason not to ϕ, we can do either, but, crucially, we cannot do both (Williams 1965; Sinnott-Armstrong 1985). We are caught on the horns of a dilemma, as some decision or choice is required between incompatible and perhaps incommensurable reasons for action. This special issue explores the moral conflicts that arise concerning our political obligations in (highly) non-ideal conditions. It is widely accepted that political obligation provides a reason for action, but also that, under certain circumstances, it may be outweighed by other, competing considerations (Walzer 1970; Smith 1973; Horton 2010). Different political obligations can come into conflict, as can happen, for example, when we are expected to support or obey existing institutions but also to help bring about just institutions (Walzer 1970). Also, our political obligations may clash with some other, competing moral demand, such as the loyalty we owe to members of our social group, or the fidelity we owe to loved ones, or what our conscience dictates (Shklar 1993; Clayton and Stevens 2014). And there are also conflicts between what is thought of as political obligations in very different cultures or regimes, which can leave us caught between the incompatible demands of, for example, liberal, illiberal, non-democratic, and tyrannical polities (Rawls 1993; Williams 2005). This special issue takes up the debate on moral conflict and political obligation, and directs it towards a number of issues that are currently of particular importance. Firstly, while it is generally agreed that we may be faced with moral conflicts, there remains considerable controversy concerning the significance, both theoretical and * Allyn Fives [email protected] 1
School of Political Science and Sociology, National University of Ireland Galway, Galway, Republic of Ireland
2
Aarhus Institute of Advanced Studies (AIAS), Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
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practical, of any such experience. This is evident from the very different answers given to a number of key questions: Are moral conflicts real? How are we to resolve moral conflicts? Are we at least occasionally required to make a groundless decision to respond to a moral conflict? If so, can some options be still considered better or more reasonable than others? And does the experience of moral conflict indicate a limit point for moral and political theory? Also, when we look at the kinds of answers given to these questions (see F
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