Moral motivation and the affective appeal
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Moral motivation and the affective appeal Jennifer Corns1 • Robert Cowan1
Ó The Author(s) 2020
Abstract Proponents of ‘‘the affective appeal’’ (e.g. Dancy in Ethics 124(4):787–812, 2014; Zagzebski in Philos Phenomenol Res 66(1):104–124, 2003) argue that we can make progress in the longstanding debate about the nature of moral motivation by appealing to the affective dimension of affective episodes such as emotions, which allegedly play either a causal or constitutive role in moral judgements. Specifically, they claim that appealing to affect vindicates a version of Motivational Internalism—roughly, the view that there is a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation—that is both more empirically respectable and less theoretically controversial than non-affective versions. We here argue that the affective appeal fails: versions of Internalism which appeal to affect are neither more empirically supported, nor clearly less controversial, than versions of Internalism which make no such appeal. Although affect doubtless has an important role to play in explaining moral motivation, we are sceptical that establishing any such role advances the debate. Keywords Moral motivation Affect Moral psychology Emotions Ethics Our starting point is a widely recognised feature of moral discourse and thought: Practicality moral judgments (understood as mental episodes)1 are importantly connected with motivation to act. 1
In contrast to speech acts.
& Robert Cowan [email protected] Jennifer Corns [email protected] 1
Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, UK
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J. Corns, R. Cowan
Consider an illustrative case. After considering the environmental impact of air travel, Anna judged that air travel is morally wrong. Previously a keen air traveller, she henceforth avoided flying. For example, when invited to international conferences she would either give her talk by Skype or travel overland. Occasionally, however, Anna’s desire for far flung parts of the world would prevail and she would fly. But in these instances, she was conflicted. Indeed, guilt would often take the shine off her enjoyment. Note three features of this case relevant to Practicality. First, adopting a new moral judgment is typically associated with alteration in the agent’s motivation. Second, the relatively direct and explanatory way in which moral judgments seem connected with motivation contrasts with other judgments, e.g. about mathematics. Third, a moral judgment can impact an agent’s motivational dispositions without resulting in action.2 Practicality is common ground among ethicists. Debate concerns how precisely to capture the connection between moral judgment and motivation. Consider: Unconditional Motivational Internalism (U-Internalism) Necessarily, if S judges that she morally ought to u, then S is motivated (at least somewhat) to act in accordance with her judgment.3 U-Internalism’s necessity claim is typically understood as either asserting metaphysical or conceptual nece
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