Motion as a Concept, an Insufficient Element in the Kantian Philosophy
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Motion as a Concept, an Insufficient Element in the Kantian Philosophy Diego Emilio Salazar Gómez1
· Francisco Luis Giraldo Gutiérrez2
Received: 20 January 2020 / Accepted: 27 August 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract This article examines the Kantian ideas on motion in his work Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. In that essay, Kant holds that motion as a concept —from its connotation as elemental and fundamental predicament of the material reality—mobilises in matter all the characteristics of its essence as a property. Nevertheless conceiving motion as a concept does not enable us to confirm the existence of motion itself in the natural world because ‘the possibility of specific natural things can’t be discovered from their mere concepts.’ (Kant in Principios metafı´sicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza. Tecnos, Madrid, 7. 1991). Therefore, the concept of movement does not evidence the existence of the movement or its characteristics and properties. Such claim would imply that motion as a concept is not evidence of the existence of motion as such and, therefore, the properties of matter cannot be mobilised based on that concept because they are characteristics of the essence of motion. Then, how does Kant intend to denote motion? Why pretend to explain matter form the concept of motion if a pure concept is, by definition, independent of the data obtained from the sensibility? (Colomer in El pensamiento alema´n. De Kant a Heidegger. Herder, Tomo I. Barcelona, 114. 1986). Therefore, ´ The Kant, Immanuel. “Principios metafı´sicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza”. Tecnos: Madrid, (1991).C Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, published by Kant in 1786, were introduced as the metaphysics of the bodily nature or rational physics, that is, a systematic sum of true philosophical knowledge. It should be noted that the work was created in a geometric fashion, based on definitions, axioms, theorems, and corollaries Arana, Juan. “El cartesianismo de Kant”. Universidad de Sevilla. ´ Colomer, Eusebi. “El pensamiento alema´n. De Kant a Enrahonar: quaderns de filosofia, (1999): 51.C Heidegger”. (T. I). Barcelona: Herder, (1986): 333. & Diego Emilio Salazar Go´mez [email protected] Francisco Luis Giraldo Gutie´rrez [email protected] 1
Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana UPB, Medellı´n, Colombia
2
Instituto Tecnolo´gico Metropolitano ITM, Medellı´n, Colombia
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Axiomathes
we will demonstrate that such weakness is the breaking point of the Kantian concept of motion in his “dynamic-metaphysical” model. Keywords Ontology · Concept · Motion · Category · Foundations
1 Introduction In the world of philosophy, motion1 has been investigated in wide-ranging discussions and with diverse approaches since ancient times. In order to depict the philosophical panorama of the concept of motion2—as a proposal for the ontological construction3 of the nature of things, this work presents diverse conceptions of motion from an ontic standpoint. Such epistemological and conceptual development of motion
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