Neuroessentialism, our Technological Future, and DBS Bubbles
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ORIGINAL PAPER
Neuroessentialism, our Technological Future, and DBS Bubbles Maxence Gaillard
Received: 30 December 2018 / Accepted: 14 April 2019 # Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract Having reviewed a considerable body of scholarly work in neuroethics related to DBS, Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen identify a major flaw in the debate—a Bbubble^ in the literature—and propose new directions for research. This comment addresses the authors’ diagnosis: What exactly is the nature of this bubble? Here, I argue that there are at least two different orientations in the BDBS causes personality changes^ bubble. According to a first narrative, DBS is a special technology because its direct, causal action on the brain leads to personality changes. This approach emphasizes the brain as the seat of personality, the locus of identity, or the center of agency. According to a second narrative, technology in general plays a major role in our lives and in our experiences as human subjects, and DBS is no exception. Technology matters up to the point that it reshapes, redefines, or re-determines traditional concepts such as personality, authenticity, or agency. I point out that both narratives are distinct components of the BDBS causes personality changes^ bubble diagnosed by the authors of the target article and claim that the two narratives raise somehow different philosophical and empirical issues.
Keywords DBS . Neuroethics . STS . Technology . Personality . Self
M. Gaillard (*) Interfaculty Initiative in Information Studies, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan e-mail: [email protected]
Introduction Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen [1] refer to the idea that deep brain stimulation (DBS) induces PIAAAS (personality, identity, agency, authenticity, autonomy, and self) changes on implanted patients as an Bunchallenged narrative.^ If there is indeed a major narrative that remains unchallenged in the academic community, then scholars run the risk of engaging in theoretical and ethical speculations detached from an empirical basis, that is, a bubble. Conscious or unconscious advocates of the narrative, or simply neuroethicists participating in the debate one way or another, would have offered a faulty, biased interpretation of what DBS, concretely, does to patients. The authors suggest that the debate should be redirected toward empirical questions and that more information should be established on the concrete effects of DBS on PIAAAS before concluding that the technology causes personality changes. The article is a major intervention in a debate that has continued for years and the authors have identified a major gap in the literature. This gap should be addressed in the years to come, in part as a response to their article. Gilbert, Viaña, and Ineichen make a diagnosis; they offer also a prognosis: As long as the theoretical bubble grows, scholarly work will not make progress and neuroethical speculations might be vain; they eventually propose a therapy, calling for more empirical studies on the
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