No Place for Compromise: Resisting the Shift to Negotiation
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No Place for Compromise: Resisting the Shift to Negotiation David Godden1 · John Casey2
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract In a series of recent papers beginning with their “Splitting a difference of opinion: The shift to negotiation” (Argumentation 32:329–350, 2018a) Jan Albert van Laar and Erik Krabbe claim that it is sometimes reasonable (i.e., rationally permissible) to shift from a critical discussion to a negotiation in order to settle a difference of opinion. They argue that their proposal avoids the fallacies of bargaining (substitut‑ ing offers for arguments) and middle ground (mistaking a compromise for a res‑ olution). Against this permissive policy for shifting to negotiation, we argue that the motivating reasons for such shifts typically fail, and that the permissive policy avoids neither fallacy while structurally incentivizing two types of strategic maneu‑ vering that constitute rational and argumentative hazards: argumentative overcharge and abandonment of discussion. Keywords Abandonment of commitment · Abandonment of discussion · Argumentative overcharge · Critical discussion · Dialogue shift · Discursive norms · Fallacy of bargaining · Fallacy of middle ground · Negotiation dialogue · Principle of retrospective evaluation · Rational resolution
1 Introduction Suppose we disagree about the rational acceptability of a standpoint—e.g., the rea‑ sonableness of a truth claim, the probative value of putative reasons or evidence for a claim, or the rational merits of a policy proposal. There are many things we might do when reaching such an impasse. * David Godden [email protected] https://www.davidgodden.ca John Casey j‑[email protected] 1
Philosophy Department, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA
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Philosophy Department, Northeastern Illinois University, 5500 North St. Louis Avenue, Chicago, IL 60625‑4699, USA
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D. Godden, J. Casey
At times it is prudent to ignore disagreement. If we are confident that our posi‑ tion is correct and the reasons informing the incompatible view neither defeat nor outweigh our own, there is little impetus, practical or epistemic, to reconsider or refute objections or alternative standpoints that we have already taken account of. So, if the success of our respective endeavors does not depend on the cooperation or agreement of the other, we might just walk away and go on about our business. The practical value of getting on with things might outweigh the cost of having one (more) disagreeable soul in the universe. If we must settle the matter, there remain several courses of action available: we might throw dice, draw straws, or consult a Ouija board. Suppose that we resist agreement-generating strategies like these on the grounds that they are, at best, only accidentally related to producing a correct, rationally defensible result. We might then argue. That is, we might engage in a critical discussion in order to establish the reasonableness of the standpoints at issue (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 2004). Alternativ
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