Noema and Noesis. Part I: Functions of Noetic Synthesis

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Noema and Noesis. Part I: Functions of Noetic Synthesis Wojciech Krysztofiak1  Received: 7 May 2019 / Accepted: 27 July 2019 © The Author(s) 2019

Abstract In the paper, the formal model of the noetic synthesis functions is presented. Together with the functions of noematic synthesis, they are understood as components of functions of intentional reference, which are meant to be, in turn, formalizations of intentional acts of reference performed in the stream of consciousness. This research perspective allows us to extend the category of speech acts to the category of all intentional acts of reference. The functions of noetic synthesis are understood as composed of the function of noetic intention acting on qualia, noetic moods and noetic modes. The model allows us to explain the phenomenon of autism as having its source in disorders of the noetic synthesis functions. The constructed model is not intended as the faithful reconstruction of the Husserlian conception of noesis. Intuitions of the creator of phenomenology are treated as the only source of inspiration. Keywords  Noetic synthesis functions · Noetic intentions · Noetic moods · Qualia · Noetic modes · Autism · Subjectivity · Noema

1 Introduction The paper undertakes the task of building the phenomenological model of the functions of noetic synthesis understood as constituents of intentional acts of consciousness. This task is the first part of a more general enterprise of formalizing a noeticnoematic model of a mental act.1 Such a model will become the basis for the formal 1

 The phenomenological concept of intentionality has several rough formalizations. One of the first attempts of this kind is the intentionality model formulated on the basis of category theory in Barušs (1989). Another way of formal representation of intentional acts is proposed in the works (Marbach 1993, 2010). In  Krysztofiak (1995) the formalization of the notion of noema is presented. Yoshimi (2016) presents the formalization of Husserl’s conception of intentionality on the ground of Gurwitschian interpretation of phenomenology. * Wojciech Krysztofiak [email protected] 1



The Institute of Philosophy, University of Szczecin, Ul. Krakowska 71‑79, 71‑004 Szczecin, Poland

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theory of elementary speech acts understood as the fusions of at least four other language acts. Every speech act is treated as composed of an act of producing an utterance, a locutionary act, an illocutionary act and an act of communication reference. The locution and illocution structure of a speech act may be interpreted as the noeticnoematic structure of an intentional act of consciousness. In the proposed model, the locutionary constituent of a speech act becomes the special act of expressing a noema of an intentional act of consciousness and the illocutionary constituent of a speech act becomes the special act of expressing of a noesis of an intentional act of consciousness. This research perspective allows us to comprehend the category of illocutions as the s