On Future Ontology: A Reply to Longenecker
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ORIGINAL PAPER
On Future Ontology: A Reply to Longenecker Timothy Tambassi1 Received: 15 August 2020 / Accepted: 12 October 2020 Ó Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract The supporters of Indeterminate Futurism Theory [IFT] suggest three different reasons for preferring their view over Growing Block Theory [GBT]. If compared to GBT, IFT offers a better account for the open future problem, our cognitive attitudes towards future contingents, and how open the future is. Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker disagrees with them, stating that the advantages suggested by IFT’s supporters are not advantages at all and/or can be accommodated by GBT. This means that, if he is right, there is no reason to prefer IFT over GBT. However, if we prove the feasibility of (at least) one of the supposed advantages of IFT, Longenecker should admit that the game between IFT and GBT could still be open. Here, we focus on our cognitive attitudes towards future, with the aim of showing that the explanation of such attitudes may be a string to IFT’s bow, as Ross Cameron suggests. Keywords Future ontology Growing block theory Indeterminate futurism theory Occam razor Future contingents
The thesis of the metaphysical openness of the future is supported by two competing views. On one side, the Growing Block Theory [GBT] defends the thesis, by rejecting the existence of any future object or event (Broad 1923; Whitehead 1938; Forrest 2004; Forbes 2016; Perovic´ 2019). On the other side, the Indeterminate Futurism Theory [IFT] maintains that it is indeterminate whether or not there are future objects or events (Barnes and Cameron 2009, 2011; Barnes and Williams 2011a, b; Cameron 2015). Both views share the idea that future contingents like ‘it will rain tomorrow’ are indeterminate in truth value. However, where the GBT says that there are no future events like the rain of tomorrow to quantify over, IFT asserts & Timothy Tambassi [email protected] https://timothytambassi.wordpress.com/ 1
Department of Science of Cultural Heritage, University of Salerno, via Giovanni Paolo II, 132, 84084 Fisciano, SA, Italy
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Axiomathes
that it is indeterminate what the domain of the (unrestricted) quantifier includes (Longenecker 2020, 1–2). So, how to choose between GBT and IFT? The supporters of IFT suggest three different reasons in defense of their positions. If compared to GBT, IFT offers a better account for: 1. The open future problem; 2. Our cognitive attitudes towards future contingents; 3. How open the future is. Longenecker (2020) disagrees with them. First, he maintains that while IFT runs into conceptual issues concerning the indeterminate existence, GBT does not. Second, Longenecker states that the advantages suggested by IFT’s supporters are not advantages at all and/or can be rather accommodated by GBT. This means that, if he is right, there is no reason to prefer IFT over GBT. However, if we prove (at least) one of the supposed advantages of IFT, Longenecker should admit that the game bet
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