On the Singularity of Descriptive Files
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On the Singularity of Descriptive Files Mayank Bora1 Received: 19 November 2017 / Revised: 12 August 2018 / Accepted: 24 August 2018 © Indian Council of Philosophical Research 2018
Abstract Jeshion (New essays on singular thought, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010b) believes that singular thought is implemented by the tokening of mental files (MFC). She also believes that an individual’s being significant to the agent is necessary and sufficient for the agent’s having singular thought about the individual (Cognitivism). Goodman (Rev Philos Psychol 7(2):437–461, 2016a, Philos Q 66:236–260, 2016b) argues that mental files created under a description lead to descriptive not singular thought. She uses this to criticize Cognitivism’s sufficiency claim and MFC. I show that this criticism rests on a faulty conception of the singular thought versus descriptive thought distinction and such files indeed lead to singular thought. This in turn shows that Cognitivism’s necessity claim is false. Keywords Singular thought · Singular versus descriptive content · Mental files · Descriptive files · Cognitivism · Semantic instrumentalism
Introduction Donald Trump is the president of USA. In thinking this, we have thought of Donald Trump and associated a piece of information with him. Thinking being a psychological process, there must be psychological means of implementing such a thought. Similarly, there must be psychological means of storing information on individuals, for instance the information about Donald Trump that he is the president of USA. Some recent work in philosophy (for example, Francois Recanati 2012) has suggested that the representation of an individual in thought and the storage of information regarding an individual are both psychologically implemented by means of psychological objects called mental files.
* Mayank Bora [email protected] 1
New Delhi, India
13
Vol.:(0123456789)
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research
Mental files may be understood in terms of their functions. They are taken to function both as psychological modes of presentation, or mental representations, of objects and as ‘repositories of information’.1 As psychological modes of representation, they underlie both the agent’s ways of thinking of individuals and the cognitive significance of singular terms in language.2 Names may be taken simply as labels for files (Graeme Forbes 1990),3 and other singular terms as different linguistic devices of accessing/invoking mental files. Use of the same mental file underlies the presumption of identity in the agent’s talk and thoughts of individuals. As repositories of information whenever any information is judged to be about that individual, i.e. taken to be true of that individual, the information is stored by the agent’s cognitive system in the corresponding mental file. The storage of information in this manner then underlies the notion of different pieces of information known or believed to be about the same individual. Storage of information in this manner also yie
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