Optimal Gerrymandering in a competitive environment
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Optimal Gerrymandering in a competitive environment John N. Friedman1 · Richard Holden2 Received: 31 May 2019 / Accepted: 25 June 2020 © Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2020
Abstract We analyze a model of optimal gerrymandering in which two parties simultaneously redistrict in a competition for influence in a legislature. Parties allocate geographic blocks to districts, in which the median voter determines the winner. The form of the optimal gerrymander involves “slices” of right-wing blocks paired with “slices” of left-wing blocks, as in Friedman and Holden (Am EconRev 98(1):113–144, 2008). We also show that, as one party controls the redistricting process in more states, that party designs districts such that the most extreme districts within its control become more extreme. We show that this comparative static holds for a broad class of objective functions. Keywords Gerrymandering · redistricting JEL Classification D72
1 Introduction A growing literature analyzes gerrymandering, the process by which politicians draw the boundaries of their own electoral districts. To simplify the analysis, most of this literature assumes that one party controls the redistricting process (Owen and Grofman 1988; Shershtyuk 1998; Gilligan and Matsusaka 1999; Friedman and Holden 2008). In practice, Republicans and Democrats each control the districting process in a number of states. In this context, the environment is best represented as Holden acknowledges ARC Future Fellowship FT130101159. We thank Christopher Teh for excellent research assistance. * Richard Holden [email protected] John N. Friedman [email protected] 1
Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA
2
School of Economics, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia
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a two-player game rather than a control problem. In this paper, we build on our work in Friedman and Holden (2008) to provide a treatment of the two-player strategic districting game. Historically, redistricting was primarily a local affair: parties relied upon block captains and local politicians with intimate knowledge of their neighborhood to determine likely voter behavior. In recent years, however, coordination across states has become prevalent. National party organizations have built ever more detailed voter databases;1 the digitization of districts through TIGERLine files and electronic Census records has made it easier for national officials to participate in local redistricting; and national parties have organized inter-state redistricting efforts, such as the so-called “REDMAP” project. These factors have allowed national strategic concerns to play an important role in redistricting.2 These concerns are the focus of this paper. Our analysis has two parts. First, we extend Friedman and Holden (2008) to a multi-state, multi-party environment. We also explicitly consider geographic constraints on redistricting by assuming that parties may only allocate whole “blocks” to districts
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