Phenomenology and functional analysis. A functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology
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Phenomenology and functional analysis. A functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology Marek Pokropski 1 # The Author(s) 2020
Abstract In the article I discuss functionalist interpretations of Husserlian phenomenology. The first one was coined in the discussion between Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre. They argue that Husserl’s phenomenology shares similarities with computational functionalism, and the key similarity is between the concept of noema and the concept of mental representation. I show the weaknesses of that reading and argue that there is another available functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology. I propose to shift perspective and approach the relation between phenomenology and functionalism from a methodological perspective, specifically taking into account the functionalist explanatory strategy called functional analysis. I discuss the notion of function in Husserl’s works and Husserl’s idea of functional phenomenology. The key argument I develop is that in functional phenomenology we can find an explanatory strategy which is analogous to the strategy of functional decomposition used in functional analysis. I conclude that the proposed functionalist reading of phenomenology opens a new approach to the integration of phenomenology with cognitive sciences. Keywords Phenomenology . Functionalism . Functional analysis . Decomposition .
Functional explanation
1 Introduction Functionalism is recognized as one of the most influential approaches to mind and cognition, usually perceived as incongruent with phenomenological approaches descending from the Husserlian tradition. I think this is misleading, and there are arguments for connections and similarities between these traditions. In philosophy of mind, functionalism may be approached from a number of different perspectives (for an
* Marek Pokropski [email protected]
1
Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
M. Pokropski
overview see e.g. Block 1980). First, as a metaphysical theory of mental states, which argues that to be a mental state is to be a functional state individuated by causal relations to other mental states and inputs and outputs. There are different types of such functionalist theories of mind, including the most popular one: computationrepresentation functionalism. The key idea behind this version of functionalism is that mental states can be understood as Turing machine table states (Putnam 1960) and the mind as a sort of computer program. In this fashion, Dreyfus (Dreyfus and Hall 1982) and McIntyre (1986) proposed computational-functionalist readings of Husserl. Second, functionalism can be approached as an explanatory strategy called functional analysis, which is applied in psychology and the cognitive sciences. Functional analysis relies on decomposing a cognitive system into component processes and capacities and describing its functional organization (Fodor 1968; Cummins 1975). Functional analysis may differ depending on what type of functionalism one is committed to, and it does not h
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