Power in the Council of the EU: organizing theory, a new index, and Brexit
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Power in the Council of the EU: organizing theory, a new index, and Brexit Philip D. Grech1 Received: 15 March 2019 / Accepted: 15 July 2020 © The Author(s) 2020
Abstract We aim to estimate the power distribution in the Council of the European Union— both a priori and a posteriori. With respect to the latter, our analysis suggests that several previously used indices are ill-suited for this application. By introducing minimal modifications, we propose a new index and compare it with previous constructions in a unified framework. Empirically, we find that that all countries gain a priori voting power in the Council as a result of Brexit. We rely on data from the Chapel Hill Expert survey to compute a posteriori power and find that it is more unequally distributed than a priori power. Specifically, a posteriori power is almost exclusively held by relatively few rather populous states (yet not the United Kingdom). As regards Brexit, France appears as the main benefactor in terms of gaining a posteriori power; Poland loses substantive power in several areas but remains one of the most powerful EU member states. Keywords A posteriori voting power · Council of the European Union · Brexit
1 Introduction We study the voting power distribution in decision-making bodies facing binary ‘yay-nay’ decisions with a particular emphasis on the effect of the removal of a member. Such situations are ubiquitous—and similarly general will be our methods—but the subject is particularly topical in the context of the European Union (EU), be it due to potential voting right suspensions in the wake of recent infringement proceedings (Poland, Hungary) or due to the exit of one of its largest members [United Kingdom (UK)]. Given its significance, we focus here on the latter. Loosely speaking, voting power is defined as the ability of each individual member (‘player’) of a decision-making body to change the outcome of a vote. * Philip D. Grech [email protected] 1
Department of Management, Technology and Economics, ETH Zurich, Scheuchzerstrasse 7, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland
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Specifically, a posteriori power takes explicit account of players’ ideological positions, to which a priori power applies the principle of insufficient reason. The former concept is sometimes seen as an enhancement of the latter, but, rather, the two just serve different purposes. A priori power is useful for normative assessments of voting rules. A posteriori power, by contrast, is descriptive and constitutes a first step towards estimating practical, ‘actual’, power.1 We focus on one of the EU’s main decision-making bodies, viz. the Council of the EU (Council of Ministers, henceforth ‘the Council’). Having a concrete application in mind is crucial from a conceptual vantage point. We shall argue that several existing power indices—most of which previously applied to the Council— are unsuitable as they measure inapplicable or even convoluted notions of power and/or are based on implausible behavioral assumptions. With respect to a pr
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