Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition
The twenty-two papers collected in this volume illustrate the itinerary of Henry Tulkens, an applied theorist, on the occasion of his retirement from teaching. The collection is structured in four parts: I. Decentralized resource allocation pr
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PUBLIC GOODS, ENVIRONMENTAL EXTERNALITIES AND FISCAL COMPETITION Selected Papers on Competition, Efficiency and Cooperation in Public Economics by Henry Tulkens
Edited and introduced by
Parkash Chander, Jacques Dre`ze, C. Knox Lovell and Jack Mintz
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ISBN:10: 0-387-25533-8 ISBN-13: 978-0387-2533-0
e- ISBN-10: 0-387-25534-6 e- ISBN-13: 978-0387-25534-7
Printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Number: 2005932167 ß 2006 Springer ScienceþBusiness Media, LLC All rights reserved. This work may not be translated or copied in whole or in part without the written permission of the publisher (Springer ScienceþBusiness Media, LLC, 233 Spring Street, New York, NY 10013, USA), except for brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis. Use in connection with any form of information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed is forbidden. The use in this publication of trade names, trademarks, service marks and similar terms, even if they are not identified as such, is not to be taken as an expression of opinion as to whether or not they are subject to proprietary rights. Printed in the United States of America 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 springer.com
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SPIN 11373711
Henry Tulkens
Table of Contents
Foreword
xi
List of co-authors
xv
Acknowledgments
xvii
PART I
Chapter 1 Chapter 2
DECENTRALIZED RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESSES FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE GOODS Introduction by Jacques Dre`ze Dynamic processes for public goods: an institution-oriented survey
1 3 9
Surplus-sharing local games in dynamic exchange processes
49
Exchange processes, the core and competitive allocations
63
Commodity exchanges as gradient processes
81
PART II ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC GOODS AND EXTERNALITIES Introduction by Parkash Chander
97 101
Chapter 3 Chapter 4
IIa Dynamic processes for achieving optimality in international environmental problems Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7
An economic model of international negotiations relating to transfrontier pollution
107
Theoretical foundations of negotiations and cost sharing in transfrontier pollution problems
123
The acid rain game as a resource allocation process, with application to negotiations between Finland, Russia and Estonia
135
viii
Contents
IIb The «core» as a solution concept for international environmental agreements Chapter 8 Chapter 9
The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution
Chapter 10 The Kyoto Protocol: an economic and game theoretic interpretation
153 177 195
IIc Dynamic cooperative games and stock pollutants Chapter 11 Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem
217
Chapter 12 Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control
251
PART III EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS Introduction by C. Knox Lovell
2
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