Radical Pragmatism in the Ethics of Belief
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Radical Pragmatism in the Ethics of Belief Samuel Montplaisir 1 Received: 8 February 2020 / Revised: 15 June 2020 / Accepted: 10 August 2020 # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract In this paper, I defend the view that only practical reasons are normative reasons for belief. This requires viewing beliefs as the predictable results of our actions. I will show how this fits with our intuitions about mental autonomy. The remainder of the paper consists in a defense against a series of objections that may be expected against this position. The paper concludes with a metaphilosophical explanation about our conflicting intuitions regarding the normativity of rationality. Keywords Ethics of belief . pragmatic reasons for belief . non-epistemic reasons for belief .
state-given reasons for belief . wrong kind of reasons . normative conflicts
1 Introduction The classical debate in the ethics of belief opposes evidentialism and pragmatism. Pragmatists hold the position that practical reasons – reasons that pertain to prudential or moral considerations for belief – can be normative reasons for belief.1 Evidentialists, for their part, defend the idea that practical reasons for belief cannot be normative reasons for belief. While this division has been useful in framing current debates, a distinct mapping of the ethics of belief might include more views. With respect to what counts as a normative reason for belief, there are four views one can hold. One might hold that there are no normative reasons for belief and, as
1 I will use the ‘belief’ as encompassing explicit beliefs, in which we sometimes include occurrent beliefs (Bogdan 1986) and dispositional beliefs, and implicit beliefs (Dennett 1987; Peels 2017). The way I use the term, then, will include cases in which an agent believes p because that person would quickly come to view p as true if he were to consider p. While not explicitly made to do so, my arguments apply the same to partial beliefs.
* Samuel Montplaisir [email protected] Extended author information available on the last page of the article
Philosophia
such, be considered an error theorist with respect to our normative judgements about belief. Evidentialists2 hold that only epistemic reasons3 are normative reasons for belief, and we shall call a “classical pragmatist”4 someone who holds that both epistemic and practical reasons can be normative reasons for belief. I write “classical pragmatism” because I wish to contrast this position with the position that only practical reasons are normative reasons for belief. Let us label this last position radical pragmatism. Radical pragmatism seems undefendable at first glance, so let’s defend it. To my knowledge, only Rinard (2018, 2019) gives an account of practical and epistemic reasons that might qualify as a radical pragmatist position.5 She argues that evidence can be understood as a means to acquire a belief, and that practical reasons can be motivating reasons for adopting a certain belief. Having a practical reason for the belief that p, I
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