Rational Delegation of Computation Based on Reputation and Contract Theory in the UC Framework
The previous schemes for rational delegation of computation resorting to game theory focus on what is the possible equilibrium results. However, they seem to ignore how to design an optimal incentive mechanism scientifically and effectively so that the fi
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Abstract. The previous schemes for rational delegation of computation resorting to game theory focus on what is the possible equilibrium results. However, they seem to ignore how to design an optimal incentive mechanism scientifically and effectively so that the final result meets designer’s expectations when a information structure is given. More importantly, there is an open question that whether the designed rational delegation of computation protocol is still secure in the UC framework. To address these challenges, in this paper, we first construct a reputation model leveraging Gompertz model to ensure that client can choose high-quality computing parties. Secondly, we design an optimal mechanism resorting to contract theory in the case of information asymmetry. Then we construct an ideal functionality for rational delegation of computation based on reputation and contract theory. In addition, we design a protocol for rational delegation of computation based on reputation and contract theory to securely realize the functionality. In the end, we prove that the proposed protocol is still secure in the UC framework. Keywords: Rational delegation of computation composable · Reputation · Contract theory
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Introduction
The core idea of delegation of computation is that the computing-constrained client outsources a calculation task to a powerful computing party. The key issue Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 61662009 and 61772008; Science and Technology Major Support Program of Guizhou Province under Grant No. 20183001; Ministry of Education-China Mobile Research Fund Project under Grant No. MCM20170401; Key Program of the National Natural Science Union Foundation of China under Grant No. U1836205; Science and Technology Program of Guizhou Province under Grant No. [2019]1098; Project of Highlevel Innovative Talents of Guizhou Province under Grant No. [2020]6008; Innovative talent team of Guizhou ordinary colleges and Universitie(Guizhou-Education-TalentTeam[2013]09). c Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 S. Yu et al. (Eds.): SPDE 2020, CCIS 1268, pp. 322–335, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9129-7_23
Rational Delegation of Computation
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in this process is how to ensure the privacy of the data and the correctness of the results. In order to be more in line with the real situation, rational delegation of computation which introduces game theory into delegation of computation is proposed, in which the players are regarded as rational players who always act in their own interests to maximize own utilities. There are some researches on rational delegation of computation resorting to game theory. An incentivizing outsourced computation scheme was proposed in [1], the authors incentivized rational contractors to work honestly by a reputation or credit system. Then Kupcu [9] constructed an incentivized outsourced computation scheme resistant to malicious contractors since he pointed out that the literature [1] could neither resist malicious contr
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