Replies to critics
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Replies to critics David Estlund1
Accepted: 10 July 2020 Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract I offer replies to critical comments on my book, Utopophobia: On the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy, in four pieces appearing in the same issue of this journal. Keywords Utopophobia Replies Ideal theory
I’m grateful to Nic Southwood for organizing this symposium, and to him along with both Geoffs, Zosia, and David for their generous and challenging comments.1 I have learned much from reading them, and from trying to adequately reply. Though a few topics recur in their comments, each piece pursues its own set of questions and criticisms with little overlap between their points. Except for cross-referencing a few places where the same part of my view is treated, it makes most sense to offer free-standing replies to each.
1 Reply to Brennan and Sayre-McCord Brennan and Sayre-McCord (hereafter ‘‘the authors’’) describe and defend something they dub ‘‘real world’’ political philosophy. From that vantage point they mount a number of interrelated challenges to my book’s arguments, positions, and methodology. I only have space to address some of these challenges. If there is a helpful big 1
Thanks also to Chad Marxen for help with proofreading and editing.
& David Estlund [email protected] 1
Brown University, Providence, USA
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D. Estlund
picture to start with it might be this: Among other things, the authors put forward several familiar lines of objection to ‘‘ideal theory,’’ or to idealistic normative political philosophy, arguments that I take myself to have anticipated and addressed. But, of course, the authors formulate them in terms that they take still to be compelling even having encountered my arguments, so it is valuable to have a chance to explain, if possible, how my responses are still responsive. What unifies the series of arguments and objections they offer is their roots in this recognizable ‘‘real world’’ political philosophy. By name, that’s a hard thing to be against, so in my responses I will hope to show that it isn’t really a fair name for any view that I criticize. But even that name does fly the flag for a traditional and familiar stance of anti-idealist thought that many readers will recognize, and it’s useful for that reason. So, we might see my replies as a partial defense of my brand of idealistic theory against these remodeled and fortified versions of that traditional critique. As is common in these things, I will be pointing out in a number of cases that the objections may rest on a misunderstanding of my view, which is my fault and not theirs. Not surprisingly, I believe my view escapes the objections even in these refurbished formulations, and so much will hang on my clarifying, if I can, how my view goes with respect to the matters they mention, how it might differ from other idealistic targets, and how those differences make the crucial difference.
1.1 Not merely conditional It is very common for skeptics about certain kinds of idealistic theorizing about justice,
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