Rescuing Liberalism from Silencing
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Rescuing Liberalism from Silencing Aluizio Couto 1 # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract
In this paper, I criticize two recent and influential arguments for no-platforming advanced by Robert Simpson and Amia Srinivasan and by Neil Levy, respectively. What both arguments have in common is their attempt to reconcile no-platforming with liberal values. For Simpson and Srinivasan, no-platforming does not contradict liberalism if grounded on the distinction between norms of free speech and norms of academic freedom; for Levy, those who defend the practice need not be accused of promoting paternalism. I argue that neither view succeeds: these authors’ views are in strong tension with core tenets of liberalism. I proceed as follows: after introducing some basic liberal principles, I explain Simpson and Srinivasan’s argument in more detail and argue that it is too strong for some their stated purposes; then I proceed to show that both Simpson and Srinivasan and Levy’s arguments would justify extremely closed universities; finally, after arguing that Levy’s stance does not circumvent paternalism, I present some evidence that no-platforming would be captured by censors and probably threaten the very academic freedom that the authors want to protect. Keywords Academic freedom . Censorship . Liberalism
Introduction No-platforming is the attempt, generally led by students, to prevent an individual from speaking at a university. As the phenomenon is already well known, I provide just a typical example. In 2017, Charles Murray, one of The Bell Curve’s authors, was invited to speak at Middlebury College. The book, among other issues, deals with the relationship between intelligence and race. After its publication in 1994, controversy broke out and the authors have since been accused of racism. Because of Murray’s infamous status, students interrupted his talk and justified doing so by claiming that inviting him was a threat. Despite not
* Aluizio Couto [email protected]
1
Federal University of Minas Gerais, Av. Pres. Antônio Carlos, 6627 - Pampulha, Belo Horizonte, MG 31270-901, Brazil
A. Couto
explaining why this would be an actual threat, it is fair to ascribe them the belief that Murray’s ideas were beyond the pale. One question promptly arises: is no-platforming compatible with the values of a free and liberal society? John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (2008) is perhaps the best place to look for an answer. There we find a passionate liberal defense of freedom of speech, which suggests that no-platforming should be rejected. Some philosophers, however, have recently claimed that we should think otherwise. In a volume dedicated to academic freedom, Simpson and Srinivasan (2018) hold that the act of denying someone a platform can be reconciled with liberal values once we distinguish norms of free speech from norms of academic freedom. According to them, the former applies to the public sphere and the latter governs both what academics do and what they are entitled to do. Neil Levy (2019), in his turn, argues in a r
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