Responsibility to protect: external intervention on Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria

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Responsibility to protect: external intervention on Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria Chijioke Egwu Ekumaoko1 · Kingsley Emeka Ezemenaka2

© Springer Nature Limited 2020

Abstract The lingering Boko Haram terrorism deserves investigation to determine whether external intervention is needed under the principle of responsibility to protect. In the application of responsibility to protect, the principal challenges have been how to respond, when to respond, and who has the authority to initiate response, especially when the protection of people at risk falls outside one’s territory. The possible application of the principle in conflict situations, as argued by many authors, is hindered by the concept of national sovereignty. Given the seeming inability of the Nigerian government to curb terrorism, here we raised the questions: should the international community intervene, what approach should be adopted, and how can the intervention be conducted without compromising Nigeria’s sovereignty? Using a qualitative methodology and the collection of primary data through documentary evidence, we highlight the failure of the Nigerian government to protect the people of Northeast Nigeria from Boko Haram and suggest that external intervention has become necessary. Keywords  Responsibility to protect · Boko Haram · Conflict · Government · Ethnic cleansing

Introduction Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, irregular warfare has often proven intractable, lasting far beyond expectations; such is the case with Boko Haram. Multiple factors contributed to the Malayan war (1948–1960) lasting as long as it did (12 years). First, the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) understood the extremity of the temperature and geography, which they utilized as a * Kingsley Emeka Ezemenaka [email protected] 1

Department of History, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria

2

Department of Political Science, Philosophical Faculty, University of Hradec Králové, Hradec Králové, Czech Republic



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C. E. Ekumaoko, K. E. Ezemenaka

complementary weapon. They also had the sympathy of the population, laid ambush and avoided open confrontation, and skillfully maximized the strategy of disappearance and operational agility. Similar factors are involved in the case of Boko Haram. Many of the soldiers fighting the insurgents were raised in southern Nigeria and are unfamiliar with the terrain of regions such as Sambisa, Kagoro, Dapchi, Chibok, Metele, and Kala Balge. Any attempt to understand why Boko Haram terrorism in Northeast Nigeria1 has remained active for a decade is likely to prove overwhelming. The complexity of the issue has given rise to multiple perspectives and theorizations as to why these terrorists remain undefeated (Onapajo 2013; Agbiboa 2013). An important perspective on terrorism is that of Dershowitz (2002), who noted that the success of terrorism is dependent on international support (example, the Palestinian case). Also, there is what is referred to as ‘local population sympathy’. This perspect