Revelation, Consciousness+ and the Phenomenal Powers View
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Revelation, Consciousness+ and the Phenomenal Powers View Philip Goff1
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract Revelation is roughly the thesis that we have introspective access to the essential nature of our conscious states. This thesis is appealed to in arguments against physicalism. Little attention has been given to the problem that Revelation is a source of pressure in the direction of epiphenomenalism, as introspection does not seem to reveal our conscious states as being essentially causal. I critique Hedda Hassel Mørch’s ‘phenomenal powers view’ response to this difficulty, before defending a form of the ‘consciousness+’ response. Keywords Consciousness · Epiphenomenalism · Causal powers · Mind–body problem · Dispositions
1 Revelation and the Threat of Epiphenomenalism Revelation is roughly the thesis that we have introspective access to the essential nature of our conscious states. When you attend to your pain, according to Revelation, you can thereby come to know what is essentially involved in feeling that way. In Goff (2017), I argued that the philosophical case for the non-physicality of consciousness hangs or fall on Revelation.1 If Revelation is true, and our conscious states have a physical nature—feeling pain essentially consists in the firing of c-fibres—then we would have introspective access to that physical nature, which is patently not the case (neuroscience is not that easy!). If Revelation is false, then it is the job of scientific investigation to determine the essential nature of consciousness, and hence there can be no philosophical grounds for disputing the physicality of consciousness. I went on to argue that Revelation is true and hence that physicalism is false, but I will not repeat those arguments here. There is much discussion of whether the alleged causal closure of the physical pushes anti-physicalists towards epiphenomenalism. But there is little attention giving to the problem that Revelation itself is a source of pressure in the direction of epiphenomenalism. For not only does introspection not reveal our conscious states to be essentially * Philip Goff [email protected] 1
Durham University, Durham, UK
physical, it does not reveal them to be essentially causal either. Reflection on the phenomenal character of a red experience does not reveal it to have any essential dispositions; it seems perfectly conceivable that red experiences should do nothing at all. But given Revelation, any essential dispositions of our conscious states ought to be accessible to us. We can press the difficulty with the following argument from Revelation to epiphenomenalism: The Revelation Argument for Epiphenomenalism Premise 1—If Revelation is true and our conscious states have some dispositions essentially, then introspection would reveal that our conscious states have some dispositions essentially. Premise 2—Revelation is true. Premise 3—It is not the case that introspection reveals that our conscious states have some dispositions essentially. Conclusion 1—Therefore, it is not the case tha
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