Russellian physicalism and its dilemma
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Russellian physicalism and its dilemma Lok-Chi Chan1
Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Russellian monism—an influential doctrine proposed by as reported by Russell (The analysis of matter, Routledge, London, 1927/1992)—is roughly the view that the natural sciences can only ever tell us about the causal, dispositional, and structural properties of physical entities and not about their categorical properties, and, moreover, that our qualia are constituted by categorical properties. Recently, Stoljar (Philos Phenomenol Res 62:253–281, 2001a), Stoljar (Philos Perspect 15:393–413, 2001b), as reported by Strawson (Real materialism: and other essays, Oxford, New York, 2008), Montero (J Conscious Stud 17:70–83, 2010), as reported by Montero (in: Alter and Nagasawa (eds) Consciousness in the physical world: perspectives on Russellian monism, Oxford University Press, New York, 2015), Alter and Nagasawa (J Conscious Stud 19:67–95, 2012), and as reported by Chalmers (in: Alter and Nagasawa (eds) Consciousness in the physical world: perspectives on Russellian monism, Oxford University Press, New York, 2015) have attempted to develop this doctrine into a version of physicalism. Russellian monism faces the so-called combination problem, according to which it is difficult to see how categorical properties could collectively constitute qualia. In this paper, I suggest that there is an insufficiently discussed aspect of the combination problem which I call the difference-maker problem. Taking the difference-maker problem into account, I argue that the combination problem—whether or not it can be solved—results in a dilemma for the project of developing Russellian physicalism. That is, Russellian monism is either physicalistically unacceptable or it is implausible; hence, Russellian monism and physicalism are incompatible.
& Lok-Chi Chan [email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, National Taiwan University, No.1, Sec.4, Roosevelt Rd, Taipei City 106, Taiwan
123
L.-C. Chan
Keywords Russellian monism Russellian physicalism Physicalism Emergentism Combination problem
1 Introduction Russellian monism is an influential doctrine in the philosophy of mind. Its seminal formulation was provided by Russell (1927a/1992, b), and it has attracted, and been developed by, many contemporary philosophers (see e.g. Chalmers 1996, 2010; Stoljar 2001a, b; Strawson 2008; Montero 2010, 2015; Alter and Nagasawa 2012; Rosenberg 2015; Goff 2017). The doctrine consists of the following three components: (1) (2)
(3)
The scientific categorical ignorance thesis Categorical properties are not knowable by the natural sciences.1 The categorical qualia thesis Our qualia are (solely or partially) grounded in categorical properties (in some manner that is not [solely] via the causal, dispositional, and structural properties that are, in turn, borne by those categorical properties). The common bases thesis Entities studied by science and our qualia have the same kind(s) of categorical properties as their bases.
Russellian monism has numerous
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