Scientific Mind and Objective World: Thomas Kuhn Between Naturalism and Apriorism
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ORIGINAL RESEARCH
Scientific Mind and Objective World: Thomas Kuhn Between Naturalism and Apriorism Thodoris Dimitrakos1,2 Received: 21 August 2017 / Accepted: 12 June 2018 Springer Nature B.V. 2018
Abstract Kuhn’s account of scientific change is characterized by an internal tension between a naturalist vein, which is compatible with the revolutionary perspective on the historical development of science, and an aprioristic or Kantian vein which wants to secure that science is not an irrational enterprise. Kuhn himself never achieved to resolve the tension or even to deal with the terms of the problem. Michael Friedman, quite recently, provided an account which aspires to reconcile the revolutionary and the aprioristic elements of the Kuhnian historiography by placing the latter in the neo-Kantian philosophical framework. In this paper, I suggest that Friedman manages to provide a convincing description of the structuration of scientific knowledge and, further, to present science as a rational enterprise. I argue that despite these virtues Friedman’s account faces a major problem with regard to the context of transcendental idealism which he is not willing to abandon. I also argue that discarding transcendental idealism in the way the philosophical perspective of John McDowell does, we can dispose of the flaws of Friedman’s account while retaining its virtues.
This research is implemented through IKY scholarships programme and co-financed by the European Union (European Social Fund - ESF) and Greek national funds through the action entitled ‘‘Reinforcement of Postdoctoral Researchers’’, in the framework of the Operational Programme ‘‘Human Resources Development Program, Education and Lifelong Learning’’ of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) 2014–2020 & Thodoris Dimitrakos [email protected] 1
University of Athens, Panepistimiopolis, 15771 Ilissia, Athens, Greece
2
Hellenic Open University, Patras, Greece
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T. Dimitrakos
1 Introduction Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1962/1990, Structure hereafter) but also his later work are a major contribution to what may be described as the revolutionary approach of scientific change. According to this conception, science proceeds though major conceptual ruptures. This approach, in its Kuhnian version, was immediately faced with accusations of relativism.1 Later in his career, Kuhn embraced the notion of dynamical or revisable priori2 and came close to the Kantian epistemological tradition/in order to cast scientific revolutions under a less relativist light. The accusations of relativism stem mainly from what can be identified as the naturalist vein of The Structure. As Bird (2012b: 205–206) points out ‘[t]here are two strands to Kuhn’s naturalism. The first concerns his use of history […]The second […] concerns his willingness to deploy evidence drawn from psychology’. Both strands are still part of contemporary discussions and the subject matter of the critical reception o
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