Sino-Russian relations: the false promise of Russian balancing
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Sino‑Russian relations: the false promise of Russian balancing Robert S. Ross1
© Springer Nature Limited 2019
Abstract The expectation that Russian will balance China’s growing presence in Central Asia and Northeast Asia is premised on fundamental misunderstandings of the nature of balance of power politics and of Russian great power capabilities. First, contrary to neorealist scholarship, secondary powers nearly always bandwagon; the traditional classical realist security studies literature’s focus on the centrality of capabilities, rather than on intentions and threat perception, explains non-great power behavior in the context of great power competition. Second, contrary to a widespread assumption, and following the understanding of the attributes of great power in the traditional security literature, Russia is not a great power in East Asia; it lacks the necessary relative great power capabilities in its Far East. China is the sole great power on mainland Northeast Asia. In this respect, the sources of Russian security policy will be similar to other secondary powers, both in East Asia and elsewhere. Keywords Sino-Russia relations · Rise of China · Balance of power · Bandwagoning Many observers of contemporary great power politics expect that as China continues to rise, Russia will experience heightened threat perception and balance Chinese power. This expectation frequently encourages analysts to promote improved US– Russian relations in Europe, the Middle East and the Caucuses to enable Russia to focus its attention on China, thus contributing to US security in East Asia.1 Policy 1 See, for example, Alexey Khlebnikov, Nikolay Shevchenko, “Russia’s Relations with the West, Through a Neorealist Filter” (interview with John Mearsheimer), Russia Direct, November 17, 2016, at http://www.russia-direct.org/qa/russias-relations-west-through-neorealist-filter (accessed July 18, 2017); Doug Bandow, “A Nixon Strategy to Break the Russia-China Axis,” The National Interest, January 4, 2017, at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/nixon-strategy-break-the-russia-china-axis-18946 (accessed July 18, 2017); Robert Matthew Shines, “Japan Outpaces U.S. in Race to Enlist Russia to Balance China,” Foreign Policy Association, January 5, 2017, at https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2017/01/05/ japan-outpaces-us-race-to-enlist-russia-to-balance-china/ (accessed July 18, 2017).
* Robert S. Ross [email protected] 1
Department of Political Science, McGuinn Hall, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA Vol.:(0123456789)
R. S. Ross
makers share this expectation. Most recently, US National Security Advisor John Bolton explained to Russian leaders that China presented a growing threat to Russian security in its Far East and that Russia should resist the rise of China.2 The expectation that Russian will balance China’s growing presence in Central Asia and Northeast Asia is premised on fundamental misunderstandings of the nature of international politics and balance of power politics and of Russi
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