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Special Section: Economic Analyses in Business Administration Peter-J. Jost1 · Anna Rohlfing-Bastian2 · Alfred Wagenhofer3

© The Author(s) 2020

In September 2018 and in September 2019, the German Economic Association of Business Administration, GEABA e. V., organized the XIX. and the XX. Symposium on the Economic Analysis of the Firm at Goethe-University Frankfurt and at WHU—Otto Beisheim School of Management in Vallendar, respectively. The contributions presented at both Symposia used economic instruments and methods such as game theory, contract theory, empirical analyses, and laboratory and field experiments to study topics in business research. The sessions were organized along a broad set of topics, for example, incentive systems and contract design, market entry strategies, taxation, strategic motivation, investments, tournaments, auditing, disclosure, digitalization, knowledge creation, performance measurement, and leadership. Moreover, at the anniversary Symposium in 2019, two panel sessions discussed the importance of microeconomic methods in management practice and management research. This Special Section includes three papers presented at the Symposia and the comments made by the discussants. All articles were subject to the standard review process of Schmalenbach Business Review. The three articles with their variety in topics (behavioral economics, finance, and marketing) and methods (theory and laboratory experiments) nicely reflect the comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach of the Symposia. Moreover, two of the three articles have been coauthored by junior scientists, which underpins the central objective of the GEABA to promote young researchers.  A. Rohlfing-Bastian

[email protected] 1

WHU—Otto Beisheim School of Management, Vallendar, Germany

2

Goethe-University Frankfurt, Frankfurt, Germany

3

University of Graz, Graz, Austria

K

344

Schmalenbach Bus Rev (2020) 72:343–345

The first paper, “Revisiting a Remedy Against Chains of Unkindness” by Wendelin Schnedler and Nina Lucia Stephan, investigates whether emotional regulation in the form of letter writing leads to more giving of people that have been treated unkindly by being assigned to a frustrating rather than a pleasant job. Previous experiments have observed that unkindly treated people also tend to treat unrelated other people unkindly. This phenomenon has been described as a “chain of unkindness” and is driven by emotions such as frustration. A potential way out of this situation could be to give the unkindly treated people a possibility for emotional regulation and thereby stop the chain of unkindness. The authors show that letter writing as an instrument of emotional regulation—as has been tested in previous experiments—also works if the decision domains of involved subjects differ. In particular, if subject A assigns subject B to an unpleasant task, letter writing to A helps B to regulate emotions and ultimately results in B giving more money to an unrelated third party C. However, the self-reported