Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions
This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that
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Editor-in-Chief M. Salles, France Series Editors P.K. Pattanaik, USA K. Suzumura, Japan
For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/6869
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Bezalel Peleg • Hans Peters
Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions
ABC
Professor Dr. Bezalel Peleg The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Institute of Mathematics and Center for the Study of Rationality Feldman Building, Givat-Ram Jerusalem 91904 Israel [email protected]
Professor Dr. Hans Peters Department of Quantitative Economics University of Maastricht P.O.Box 616 6200 MD Maastricht The Netherlands [email protected]
Studies in Choice and Welfare ISSN 1614-0311 ISBN 978-3-642-13874-4 e-ISBN 978-3-642-13875-1 DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1 Springer Heidelberg Dordrecht London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2010934384 c Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilm or in any other way, and storage in data banks. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the German Copyright Law of September 9, 1965, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Violations are liable to prosecution under the German Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Cover design: WMXDesign GmbH, Heidelberg Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Preface
This book was written mainly during the Spring periods of 2008 and 2009, when the first author was visiting Maastricht University. Financial support both from the Dutch Science Foundation NWO (grants 040.11.013 and 0.40.11.082) and from the research institute METEOR (Maastricht University) is gratefully acknowledged. Jerusalem Maastricht April 2010
Bezalel Peleg Hans Peters
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Contents
Preview to this book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
xi
Part I Representations of constitutions 1
Introduction to Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Motivation and summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Arrow’s constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and its implications . . . . . . . . . 1.4 G¨ ardenfors’s model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Notes and comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3 3 3 4 5 6
2
Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms . . . . . . 2.1 Mo
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