Subgame Consistent Cooperation A Comprehensive Treatise
Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of
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David W.K. Yeung Leon A. Petrosyan
Subgame Consistent Cooperation A Comprehensive Treatise
Theory and Decision Library C Game Theory, Social Choice, Decision Theory, and Optimization Volume 47
Editors-in-Chief Herve´ Moulin, Glasgow, Scotland, United Kingdom Hans Peters, Maastricht, The Netherlands Honorary Editor Stef H. Tijs, Tilburg, The Netherlands Editorial Board Jean-Jacques Herings, Maastricht, The Netherlands Matthew O. Jackson, Stanford, CA, USA Mamuro Kaneko, Tokyo, Japan Hans Keiding, Copenhagen, Denmark Bezalel Peleg, Jerusalem, Israel Clemens Puppe, Karlsruhe, Germany Alvin E. Roth, Stanford, CA, USA David Schmeidler, Tel Aviv, Israel Reinhard Selten, Koenigswinter, Germany William Thomson, Rochester, NJ, USA Rakesh Vohra, Evanston, IL, USA Peter P. Wakker, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6618
David W.K. Yeung • Leon A. Petrosyan
Subgame Consistent Cooperation A Comprehensive Treatise
David W.K. Yeung Center of Game Theory Saint Petersburg State University St Petersburg, Russia SRS Consortium for Advanced Study in Cooperative Dynamic Games Hong Kong Shue Yan University Hong Kong
Leon A. Petrosyan Faculty of Applied Mathematics-Control Processes St Petersburg State University St Petersburg, Russia
ISSN 0924-6126 ISSN 2194-3044 (electronic) Theory and Decision Library C ISBN 978-981-10-1544-1 ISBN 978-981-10-1545-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-981-10-1545-8 Library of Congress Control Number: 2016952867 Mathematics Subject Classification: 91A12, 91A25, 49N70, 91A35, 91A80 © Springer Science+Business Media Singapore 2016 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. Printed on acid-free paper This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer Science+Business Media Singapore Pte Ltd.
Preface
It is well known that noncooperative behaviors among participants would lead to an outcome which is not Pareto optimal and it could even be highly undesirable. The
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