Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance in the European Union

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Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance in the European Union Kees van Kersbergena and Bertjan Verbeekb,1 a Department of Political Science, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081c (DBL 856), NL-1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected] b Department of Political Science, University of Nijmegen, PO Box 9108, NL-6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected]

Subsidiarity has been introduced at the 1991 Maastricht conference as a principle of European governance. This article traces its development over the past 15 years and attempts to assess the effect of the subsidiarity principle on European governance. The impact of subsidiarity varies across time and across issue area. This is related to the fact that the European Union is at the same time characterized by inter-state relations and relations typical of a ‘regular’ political system. This specific nature of the European polity requires us to analyze policy-making in terms of different policy arenas which are sometimes inter-state in nature and sometimes more ‘regular’. This concept of European policy-making differs from the approaches currently dominating the field: intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance. Although the effect of subsidiarity varies with the different natures of European policy arenas, the principle has tended to strengthen the position of the national governments of the Member States. This tendency has been continued in the operation of the Open Method of Coordination and the proposals regarding subsidiarity in the European Convention. Comparative European Politics (2004) 2, 142–162. doi:10.1057/palgrave.cep.6110033 Keywords: subsidiarity; Open Method of Coordination; European Convention; intergovernmentalism; multi-level governance; European governance

Introduction The European Union (EU) policy process is inter-state and state-like at the same time. Its particular nature ensures that governance principles, such as subsidiarity and the Open Method of Coordination, once they have been adopted, not only are difficult to remove from the agenda, but also quickly assume a political significance that transforms the conditions under which inter-state and state-like decision-making takes place. Intergovernmental conferences, but also venues such as the European Convention, offer recurring opportunities to redefine the purpose of governance principles, which effectively affect relations of power between the EU’s institutional actors as well as between the European Union and its Member States. Therefore,

Kees van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance

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governance principles gradually start functioning as political institutions. Moreover, the exact meaning and effect of such principles depend on the weight carried by specific coalitions of actors and thus on the complex political process that is so characteristic of EU politics. The history of subsidiarity in the EU demonstrates a fluctuation in its impact varying with changing coalitions making use of specific windows