The Bridge Principle and Stigmatized Truth-Values
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The Bridge Principle and Stigmatized Truth‑Values Ricardo Mena1
© Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract The Bridge Principle states that one shouldn’t assert a sentence that is indeterminate relative to possibilities that are still live options. This principle serves as a bridge between semantic and pragmatic presuppositions. I argue that, given the phenomenon of vagueness, the bridge principle cannot be true as formulated. An alternative formulation of the Bridge Principle is offered. Keywords Philosophy of language · Presupposition · Vagueness
1 Introduction The notion of the semantic presupposition of a sentence has proven to be theoretically useful. We say that p semantically presupposes q iff the truth of q is required for the truth or falsity of p. For example, it is quite common to think that 1. The King of Westeros is mad. Semantically presupposes that there is a king of Westeros. One of the things that this notion is meant to explain is why we wouldn’t judge (1) to be true or false, once we know that there is no king of Westeros.1 Similarly, the notion of the pragmatic presupposition of a sentence has proven to be quite useful. We say that p pragmatically presupposes q iff p cannot be felicitously asserted relative to a conversation such that its participants don’t take q for granted. It’s quite plausible to think that (1) also pragmatically presupposes that there is a king of Westeros. One of the things this notion is meant to explain is that it is generally expected that some sentences can only be felicitously asserted if certain propositions are taken for granted by the participants in the conversation (Stalnaker 2014).2 It’s uncontroversial to think that the source of semantic presuppositions is conventional: it is part of the conventional meaning of certain expressions that they trigger this kind of presupposition. One may think, for instance, that the trigger * Ricardo Mena [email protected] 1
IIF-UNAM, Mexico City, Mexico
in (1) is the definite description “The King of Westeros”. Hence, semantic presuppositions can be understood as some sort of semantic implication. As such, it’s quite natural to think that its source is conventional. Now, the sources of pragmatic presuppositions are a bit more tricky to find. Stalnaker (1973) and Abusch (2002) have been pluralistic about this issue. However, it’s tempting to think that sometimes the sources of pragmatic presuppositions are semantic presuppositions: that is to say, sometimes the reason why a sentence pragmatically presupposes a proposition is because that sentence semantically presupposes that same proposition.3 This idea is far from crazy, given that one should expect some non-trivial connections between felicity and definiteness conditions to obtain. So, for instance, one may think that since (1) isn’t defined unless it’s true that there is a king of Westeros, one cannot felicitously assert that sentence unless the participants to the conversation take for granted that there is such a king. Of course, things are a bit more complicat
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