The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning
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The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning John Brunero1 Received: 8 April 2020 / Accepted: 10 August 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract According to the Aristotelian Thesis, the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. Critics argue against it by pointing to cases in which some interference or inability prevents the production of action, yet in which that interference or inability doesn’t impugn the success of an agent’s reasoning. Some of those critics suggest instead that practical reasoning concludes in an intention, while others suggest it concludes in a belief with normative content, such as a belief about what one has conclusive, or sufficient, reason to do. In this paper, I argue that we should allow that practical reasoning could conclude in either an intention or a belief with normative content. I begin by developing an objection to the Aristotelian Thesis, showing how the objection will not also undermine the possibility of practical reasoning concluding in an intention or a belief. I then respond to an argument from Joseph Raz designed to exclude the possibility of intentions as conclusions of practical reasoning. Lastly, I show how the worry that belief isn’t sufficiently “practical” to qualify as a conclusion of practical reasoning is misplaced. Keywords Practical reasoning · Aristotelian Thesis · Instrumental reasoning · Intentions · Dancy · Raz According to the Aristotelian Thesis, the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action. Defenders of this thesis hold that it provides a way of distinguishing theoretical from practical reasoning: whereas theoretical reasoning concludes in a belief, practical reasoning concludes in an action. They will concede the possibility of theoretical reasoning about a practical subject matter—for instance, my reasoning to some belief about how I, or someone else, ought to act in a particular set of circumstances, perhaps even the very circumstances in which I now find myself. However, Aristotelians insist that such reasoning isn’t, strictly speaking, practical reasoning if it doesn’t issue in an action. Rather, it’s merely theoretical reasoning about a practical subject matter. * John Brunero [email protected] 1
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE, USA
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Several philosophers, including Elizabeth Anscombe, have attributed the thesis to Aristotle, and there are passages in Aristotle’s work which suggest that he would endorse it.1 But I’m going to leave aside the question of how to interpret Aristotle. There are enough contemporary defenders of the Aristotelian Thesis—including Philip Clark, Sergio Tenenbaum, Christine Korsgaard, Jonathan Dancy, and Patricio Fernandez—to make it an interesting topic of discussion in its own right.2 The Aristotelian Thesis is controversial. Critics argue against it by pointing to cases in which some interference or inability prevents the production of action, yet in which that interference or inability doesn’t impugn the success of an agent’s reasoning. Suppose it’s getting too da
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