The cultural evolution of mind-modelling

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The cultural evolution of mind-modelling Richard Moore1,2,3 Received: 19 November 2019 / Accepted: 31 August 2020 © The Author(s) 2020

Abstract I argue that uniquely human forms of ‘Theory of Mind’ (or ‘ToM’) are a product of cultural evolution. Specifically, propositional attitude psychology is a linguistically constructed folk model of the human mind, invented by our ancestors for a range of tasks and refined over successive generations of users. The construction of these folk models gave humans new tools for thinking and reasoning about mental states—and so imbued us with abilities not shared by non-linguistic species. I also argue that uniquely human forms of ToM are not required for language development, such that an account of the cultural origins of ToM does not jeopardise the explanation of language development. Finally, I sketch a historical model of the cultural evolution of mental state talk. Keywords Cultural evolution · Theory of mind · Propositional attitudes · Language development

1 Introduction Mindreading (involving the use of a ‘theory of mind’, or ‘ToM’) is the ability to attribute intentions, beliefs, and desires (and related mental states). This practice of ‘folk psychology’ characteristically takes the form of attributing propositional attitudes. These are combinations of representations (e.g., it is raining) and metarepresentational attitudes towards those representations (e.g., Felix believes that it is raining). Propositional attitudes can include beliefs and desires which, when combined, generate intentions, which lead to action. The ability to craft folk psychological explanations is a central component of a human ToM and is valuable for a number of reasons—including the explanation of behaviour. For example, if Felix wants to go out but believes that it

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Richard Moore [email protected]

1

Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK

2

Fachbereich Sozial- und Bildungswissenschaften, Fachhochschule Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany

3

School of Philosophy, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

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is raining and prefers to stay dry, he may decide to take an umbrella. Someone who can attribute these mental states can explain why Felix took an umbrella when he left home. While adult humans are better at mindreading than other species, the origins of uniquely human ToM are disputed. Nativist accounts (e.g. Sperber 2000; Scott-Phillips 2014) argue that humans are born with better ToM than other species—and that this is why only humans acquire language. In contrast, constructivists argue that ToM is something that children learn (e.g. Garfield et al. 2001; Van Cleave and Gauker 2010; Jary 2010)—such that there are fundamental differences in the mindreading abilities of children and adults. Heyes and Frith (2014) further emphasise that ToM is a product of cultural evolution—a set of tools for thinking about minds that was invented by our ancestors and developed by subsequent generations. On this development of the constructivist view, differ