The forces of attraction: How security interests shape membership in economic institutions
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The forces of attraction: How security interests shape membership in economic institutions Christina L. Davis1
· Tyler Pratt2
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2020
Abstract The link between security and economic exchange is widely recognized. But when and how much do geopolitical interests matter for economic cooperation? While existing work focuses on bilateral trade and aid, we examine how geopolitics shapes membership in multilateral economic organizations. We demonstrate that substantial discrimination occurs as states welcome or exclude states based on foreign policy similarity. Biased selection of members can politicize economic cooperation despite multilateral norms of non-discrimination. We test the geopolitical origins of institutional membership by analyzing new data on membership patterns for 231 economic organizations from 1949 – 2014. Evidence shows that security ties shape which states join and remain in organizations at both the formation and enlargement stages. We use a finite mixture model to compare the relative power of economic and geopolitical considerations, finding that geopolitical alignment accounts for nearly half of the membership decisions in economic institutions. Keywords International cooperation · Economic statecraft · Membership in international organizations · Multilateral economic organizations · Alliances · Issue linkage · Finite mixture model JEL Classification F53 · F02
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-020-09395-w) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. Christina L. Davis
[email protected] Tyler Pratt [email protected] 1
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University 1737 Cambridge Street Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
2
Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520, USA
C. L. Davis and T. Pratt
1 Introduction Like social clubs, international organizations sort states into groups. During the formation and enlargement of international organizations, membership depends on states’ specific attributes relevant to the regulated issue as well as their broader political relations. Geopolitical discrimination occurs when states selectively allow those who share their foreign policy interests to enter international organizations. This paper measures the timing and weight allocated to geopolitics in the membership choices for multilateral economic organizations. We demonstrate that geopolitical discrimination has been a prevalent practice across a broad swathe of economic organizations for over sixty years. In this role, shared security interests form a foundation for economic cooperation. We are not the first to study the interaction between states’ economic and security interests (e.g. Gowa and Mansfield 1993; Mansfield and Bronson 1997; Mansfield and Brian 2003; Lake 2009). During the Cold War states allocated aid according to the military importance of recipients, and new strategic needs shape development policies today (e.g. Meernik
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