The Moral Wager Evolution and Contract
This book illuminates and sharpens moral theory, by analyzing the evolutionary dynamics of interpersonal relations in a variety of games. We discover that successful players in evolutionary games operate as if following this piece of normative advice: Don
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Philosophical Studies Series VOLUME 108
Founded by Wilfrid S. Sellars and Keith Lehrer Editor Keith Lehrer, University of Arizona, Tucson Associate Editor Stewart Cohen, Arizona State University, Tempe Board of Consulting Editors Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts at Amherst Radu Bogdan, Tulane University, New Orleans Marian David, University of Notre Dame John M. Fischer, University of California at Riverside Allan Gibbard, University of Michigan Denise Meyerson, Macquarie University François Recanati, Institut Jean-Nicod, EHESS, Paris Mark Sainsbury, University of Texas at Austin Stuart Silvers, Clemson University Barry Smith, State University of New York at Buffalo Nicholas D. Smith, Lewis & Clark College Linda Zagzebski, University of Okalahoma
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
THE MORAL WAGER Evolution and Contract MALCOLM MURRAY University of Prince Edward Island, Charlottetown, Canada
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-1-4020-5854-7 (HB) ISBN 978-1-4020-5855-4 (e-book) Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. www.springer.com
Printed on acid-free paper
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PREFACE
In the following chapters, I offer an evolutionary account of morality and from that extrapolate a version of contractarianism I call consent theory. Game theory helps to highlight the evolution of morality as a resolution of interpersonal conflicts under strategic negotiation. It is this emphasis on strategic negotiation that underwrites the idea of consent. Consent theory differs from other contractarian models by abandoning reliance on rational self-interest in favour of evolutionary adaptation. From this, more emphasis will be placed on consent as natural convergence rather than consent as an idealization. My picture of contractarianism, then, ends up looking more like the relativist model offered by Harman, rather than the rational (or pseudo-rational) model offered by Gauthier, let alone the Kantian brands of Rawls or Scanlon. So at least some of my discussion will dwell on why it is no loss to abandon hope for the universal, categorical morality that rational models promise. In the introduction, I offer the betting analogy that underwrites the remaining picture. There are some bets where the expected utility is positive, though the odds of winning on this particular occasion are exceedingly low. In such cases, we cannot hope to give an argument that taking the bet is rational. The only thing we can say is that those predisposed to take this kind of bet on th
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