The Motivating Role of Truth in Reasoning: A Defence of Object-Dependent Fregean Senses
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The Motivating Role of Truth in Reasoning: A Defence of Object‑Dependent Fregean Senses Johan Gersel1 Received: 30 August 2019 / Accepted: 5 September 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Intuitively, when all goes well, we adopt beliefs based on inference because we realize that their truth is established by the truth of the involved premises. If this intuitive picture of our successful reasoning is correct, then it must be possible that our reasoning is motivated by our sensitivity to the soundness of the involved inference. This paper argues that such a view of ideal reasoning can only be upheld if we accept the minority view that the proper inferential role of our thoughts is individuated in terms of object dependent Fregean senses. I consider respectively Millian, Guise–Fregean, and object dependent Fregean views, and show how only the latter view provides a picture of our theoretical reasoning where sensitivity to soundness can be what motivates a subject’s reasoning. Valid reasoning is good and fine but, no matter how valid your reasoning, it does not ensure the truth of your conclusions. And truth is ultimately what we are after when we form beliefs. Sound reasoning, on the other hand, allows us to draw conclusions whose truth we can be assured of. Hence, soundness sets both a higher and more intuitive standard for propriety in reasoning. However, this would be a rather empty ideal if it were inherently impossible for human reasoners to engage in sound reasoning as such. Therefore, the question I want to raise is how we account for cognition, such that it is possible for a person to draw a conclusion in a way that is properly sensitive to the soundness of the inference involved. Naturally, we sometimes draw false conclusions, so we cannot be infallible in our sensitivity to soundness. But how must our cognition be constituted if, just in the best of cases, we are indeed correct in our intuition that it is because we appreciate an inference as sound that we are motivated to accept the conclusion. An account of cognition that allows this requires that successful human reasoning can simultaneously be motivated by the subject’s sensitivity to the truth of the premises and to the way in which these * Johan Gersel [email protected] 1
Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 18 B, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
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premises establish the truth of the conclusion. In this paper, I will go through the dominant theories of content and show why only the theory that individuates content in terms of object dependent Fregean Senses allows for such a picture of human cognition. Some may balk at the very idea that we can be motivated in our reasoning by the soundness of the inference. Yet consider how we would answer when questioned why we accepted a given conclusion as true. A rather intuitive response is that one realized that the truth of the conclusion was logically entailed by other beliefs one knew to be true. After all, if on
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