The Place of Probability in Science In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953-2
Science aims at the discovery of general principles of special kinds that are applicable for the explanation and prediction of the phenomena of the world in the form of theories and laws. When the phenomena themselves happen to be general, the principlesi
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BOSTON STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Editors ROBERT S. COHEN, Boston University JÜRGEN RENN, Max Planck Institute for the History of Science KOSTAS GAVROGLU, University of Athens
Editorial Advisory Board THOMAS F. GLICK, Boston University ADOLF GRÜNBAUM, University of Pittsburgh SYLVAN S. SCHWEBER, Brandeis University JOHN J. STACHEL, Boston University MARX W. WARTOFSKY†, (Editor 1960–1997)
VOLUME 284
For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/5710
THE PLACE OF PROBABILITY IN SCIENCE In Honor of Ellery Eells (1953–2006)
Ellery Eells • J.H. Fetzer Editors
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Editors Ellery Eells Springer 3311 GC Dordrecht Netherlands
Prof. J.H. Fetzer University of Minnesota Dept. Philosophy Duluth MN 55812 USA [email protected]
ISBN 978-90-481-3614-8 e-ISBN 978-90-481-3615-5 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3615-5 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2010925023 c Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Cover design: Boekhorst Design b.v. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Ellery Eells in memoriam
Ellery Eells (1953–2006)
Preface
Science aims at the discovery of general principles of special kinds that are applicable for the explanation and prediction of the phenomena of the world in the form of theories and laws. When the phenomena themselves happen to be general, the principles involved assume the form of theories; and when they are particular, they assume the form of general laws. Theories themselves are sets of laws and definitions that apply to a common domain, which makes laws indispensable to science. Understanding science thus depends upon understanding the nature of theories and laws, the logical structure of explanations and predictions based upon them, and the principles of inference and decision that apply to theories and laws. Laws and theories can differ in their form as well as in their content. The laws of quantum mechanics are indeterministic (or probabilistic), for example, while those of classical mechanics are deterministic (or universal) instead. The history of science reflects an increasing role for probabilities as properties of the world but also as measures of evidential support and as degrees of subjective belief. Our purpose is to clarify and illuminate the place of probability in science. The fundamental conceptions of probability that matter to science are both objective as properties of the world: the frequency conception, for which “probabilities” stand for relative (or limiting frequencies) of outcomes (such as heads) across sequences of trials (such as tosses of
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