The problem of arbitrary requirements: an abrahamic perspective
- PDF / 668,907 Bytes
- 22 Pages / 439.37 x 666.142 pts Page_size
- 51 Downloads / 172 Views
The problem of arbitrary requirements: an abrahamic perspective Sara Aronowitz1 · Marilie Coetsee2 · Amir Saemi3 Received: 12 June 2020 / Accepted: 26 August 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Some religious requirements seem genuinely arbitrary in the sense that there seem to be no sufficient explanation of why those requirements with those contents should pertain. This paper aims to understand exactly what it might mean for a religious requirement to be genuinely arbitrary and to discern whether and how a religious practitioner could ever be rational in obeying such a requirement (even with full knowledge of its arbitrariness). We lay out four accounts of what such arbitrariness could consist in, and show how each account provides a different sort of baseline for understanding how obedience to arbitrary requirements could, in principle, be rational. Keywords Arbitrary requirements · Religious obligations · Rationality of religious requirements I have just learned that my religion requires me to follow this law: I must perform four cycles of prayer after the length of an object’s shadows becomes equal to the length of the object itself, and before sunset.1 This norm is puzzling: why is the turning point four cycles rather than three, for instance? Perhaps there is some reason for this norm that I do not yet understand. If so, this norm is not genuinely arbitrary; it merely appears to be so because of my epistemic limitations. On the other hand, it may be that the requirement is genuinely arbitrary: it may be that there are no sufficient reasons to explain why this requirement with this content should 1
Robinson (2013), Islam: A Concise Introduction, 98.
Sara Aronowitz, Marilie Coetsee, Amir Saemi have contributed equally. * Amir Saemi [email protected] 1
Princeton University, Princeton, USA
2
University of Richmond, Richmond, USA
3
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences – IPM, Tehran, Iran
13
Vol.:(0123456789)
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
pertain—especially as in contrast with some other similar requirement that has a slightly different content.2 If a requirement merely appears arbitrary, a religious practitioner might still be rational in obeying it. Perhaps, for instance, God understands the rationale for the requirement and assures her that there are good reasons for obeying it. Perhaps she is justified in believing God, and so—by extension—rational in obeying the requirement. But what if the practitioner comes to know that the requirement is genuinely arbitrary?3 In this case, it is hard to see how her choice to obey the requirement could be rational. This paper aims to understand exactly what it might mean for a religious requirement to be genuinely arbitrary and to discern whether and how a religious practitioner could ever be rational in obeying such a requirement (even with full knowledge of its arbitrariness). We will lay out four accounts of what such arbitrariness could consist in, and show how each account provides a different sort of baseline
Data Loading...
