The Problem of Embodiment Some Contributions to a Phenomenology of t
Early in the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomeno logie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Edmund Husserl stated concisely the significance and scope of the problem with which this present study is concerned. When we reflect on how it i
- PDF / 30,694,271 Bytes
- 302 Pages / 439 x 666 pts Page_size
- 20 Downloads / 173 Views
PHAENOMENOLOGICA COLLECTION PUBLlEE SOUS LE PATRONAGE DES CENTRES D' ARCHIVES-HUSSERL
17
RICHARD M. ZANER
The Problem of Embodiment SOME CONTRIBUTIONS TO A PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY
Comite de redaction de 1a collection: President: H. L. Van Breda (Louvain); Membres: M. Farber (Buffalo), E. Fink (Fribourg en Brisgau), A. Gurwitsch, (New York). J. Hyppolitet (Paris). L. Landgrebe (Cologne). M. Merleau-Pontyt (Paris), P. Ricoeur (Paris). K. H. Volkmann-Schluck (Cologne), J. Wahl (Paris); Secretaire: J. Taminiaux (Lou vain)
RICHARD M. ZANER
Tbe Problem oE Embodiment SOME CONTRIBUTIONS TO A PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY
SECOND EDITION
MARTINUS NljHOFF
I THE HAGUE I 197 1
I97I by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. Netherlands All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
@
Softcover reprint o/the hardcover 1st edition 1971
ISBN-13: 978-94-010-3016-8 DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-3014-4
e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-3014-4
To My Wile, Junanne. lor her patient and enduring love
PREFACE
Early in the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Edmund Husserl stated concisely the significance and scope of the problem with which this present study is concerned. When we reflect on how it is that consciousness, which is itself absolute in relation to the world, can yet take on the character of transcendence, how it can become mundanized, We see straightaway that it can do that only by means of a certain participation in transcendence in the first, originary sense, which is manifestly the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the experiential relation to the animate organism does consciousness become really human and animal (tierischen) , and only thereby does it achieve a place in the space and in the time of Nature.l
Consciousness can become "worldly" only by being embodied within the world as part of it. In so far as the world is material Nature, consciousness must partake of the transcendence of material Nature. That is to say, its transcendence is manifestly an embodiment in a material, corporeal body. Consciousness, thus, takes on the characteristic of being "here and now" (ecceity) by means of experiential (or, more accurately, its intentive) relation to that corporeal being which embodies it. Accordingly, that there is a world for consciousness is a consequence in the first instance of its embodiment by 2 that corporeal body which is for it its own animate organism. Conversely, that corporeal body becomes a genuinely animate organism (Leib), as opposed to a mere physical body (Korper) , only by means of 1 H usserl, I dcen zu ciner erinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie Erstes Bueh, Max Niemeyer (Halle a. d. S., 1913), p. 103. 2 We use thc preposition "by" advisedly, especially to avoid the spatial connotations of the more usual "in". Spatial determinations arise after, not before, embodimcn t.
VIII
PREFACE
consciousness' intentiveness to it as its own animate organism that is
