The Strategic Principle and the Maxim of Selectivity

In this chapter I provide an outline of the classical Gricean theory of implicatures, outlining the points in which it is not applicable to the legal realm. Next, I give an account of theories that have tried to modify the Gricean picture to fit it to the

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The Strategic Principle and the Maxim of Selectivity

This study aims to outline the functioning of legal language through a modified Gricean paradigm. Thus, I will first present the Gricean and the neo-Gricean ideas as well as where they cannot fit the picture of legal language. Secondly, I will try to alter some Gricean ideas so as to give an adequate account of the legal realm. The hypothesis is that there is a folk theory of how legal language should function in a democratic society. Moreover, this folk theory is close to the classic Gricean picture. Nevertheless, the actual way in which legal language functions is quite different and I will try to show why this is the case and in what respect. In chapter I, the term ‘legal discourse’ is often employed. Under this term, one could mean the following linguistic exchanges that occur within the realm of law: 1 . An exchange within a legislative body 2. An exchange between a legislature and courts 3. An exchange between court and parties 4. An exchange between parties 5. Contracts and other legal declarations of intent This study concentrates on the second type of legal discourse—the exchange between legislatures and courts. My purpose is to develop an explanatory theory.

2.1  Outline of the Classical Gricean Project In 1975 Paul Grice published the article ‘Logic and conversation’ (Grice 1975). At its outset he claims that he wants to stay away from the debate over formalism vs. anti-formalism, which is understood as a debate of whether we should construct an ideal language or instead analyze the ways in which natural language actually works. He claims:

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 I. Skoczeń, Implicatures within Legal Language, Law and Philosophy Library 127, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12532-5_2

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2  The Strategic Principle and the Maxim of Selectivity I wish, rather, to maintain that the common assumption of the contestants that the divergences [between the ‘ideal’ language of logic and natural language] do in fact exist is (broadly speaking) a common mistake, and that the mistake arises from an inadequate attention to the nature and importance of the conditions governing conversation. (Grice 1975)

Thus, it is possible to give an account of the different uses of language or the different language games we play with the use of some at least quasi-logical rules which enable inferences about what someone is intending to communicate. Grice’s idea was that people engage in all sorts of rational and purposive behavior governed by rules, and that one variety of such behavior is communication. Grice is more specific because he uses the word ‘talking’ (Grice 1975). The main purpose is ‘giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others’ (Grice 1975), because this is what enables humans to achieve further goals. Grice claims that the analysis of an uttered sentence leads to the distinguishing of two contents that are propositional (that are truth-apt): what is said and what is implicated. Both are complex. To grasp what