The Subject-Dependency of Perceptual Objects
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The Subject‑Dependency of Perceptual Objects Błażej Skrzypulec1 Received: 18 September 2019 / Accepted: 14 September 2020 © The Author(s) 2020
Abstract Entities that are, in ordinary perceptual situations, veridically presented as objects can be called ‘perceptual objects’. In the philosophical literature, one can find various approaches to the crucial features that distinguish the class of perceptual objects. While these positions differ in many respects, they share an important general feature: they all characterize perceptual objects as largely subject-independent. More specifically, they do not attribute a significant constitutive role to the perceptual relation connecting a fragment of the environment with a perceiving subject. Fragments of the environment are perceptual objects no matter whether they stand in a perceptual relation to any subject, mainly by virtue of having a certain physical structure. I question this common assumption, relying on Green’s (2019) definition of perceptual objects, arguing that a proper theory of perceptual objects should accommodate the constitutive role of perceptual relations. This is because there exist fragments of the environment that are perceptual objects only when they stand in a perceptual relation to a subject.
1 Introduction Within contemporary philosophy of perception, there is wide consensus that perceptual experiences commonly present individual objects (e.g., Jeshion 2010; Mehta 2014; Schellenberg 2016; Soteriou 2000). Ordinary perceptual states seem to involve standing in perceptual relations to some objects, and it is in virtue of such relations that we are able to gain knowledge about objects’ properties, form singular thoughts, and conduct successful actions (e.g., Brewer 2015; Martin 2002; Nanay 2012). Furthermore, it is also commonly believed that perception not only presents individual objects but also, in ordinary circumstances, correctly presents them as being objects. For instance, objects are typically experienced as being spatiotemporally coherent, as persisting through time despite movement, and as being figures
* Błażej Skrzypulec [email protected] 1
Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, ul. Grodzka 52, 31‑044 Kraków, Poland
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differentiated from ground (e.g., Green 2019; Kubovy and Schutz 2010; Scholl 2007; O’Callaghan 2016). Entities that are, in ordinary perceptual situations, correctly presented as objects can be named ‘perceptual objects’. However, it is far from obvious how to more precisely characterize the category of perceptual objects. First, even within a single modality, such as vision, the class of perceptual objects seems to be significantly heterogeneous. For instance, it is plausible that visual perceptual objects are both tables, flat figures, swarms of insects, or clouds. Second, the situation becomes even more complicated if one takes into account perceptual objects related to different modalities, as it is not clear whether all human modalities present objects (e
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