Thinking the Right Way (at the Right Time) about Virtues and Skills
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Thinking the Right Way (at the Right Time) about Virtues and Skills Scott Woodcock 1 Accepted: 17 November 2020/ # Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Let me begin by thanking Matt Stichter and the other participants in this symposium for including me in such an interesting conversation about the relationship between virtue and skill. Also, let me say that I think Stichter has written an excellent book – one that is remarkably lucid, focussed in its aims, and well-supported with secondary literature. At every point while reading the book I found the links between its arguments clear, and I also found that it was always plain how individual arguments fit into the broader aims of the work as a whole. This nod to accessibility might sound like faint praise, but I think it is an underappreciated trait that ought to be acknowledged and celebrated. Moreover, the book exhibits an Aristotelian mean dear to my heart: providing readers with just the right amount of helpful citations to other sources. Books that avoid the hard work of providing detailed references give me fits, as do those that paste in extended laundry lists of generic references without offering any specific details or annotation. Both stand to learn lessons in scholarship from Stichter’s example. The principal thesis of the book is that virtue is best conceptualized as a particular type of skill, and the chapters explore the implications of this thesis for a variety of issues related to moral development, social psychology and comparisons of virtuous agents with persons exhibiting more familiar kinds of expertise. Specifically, the first two chapters of the book describe key features of moral development in terms of self-regulation and skill acquisition for agents with our unique psychological capacities. The next two chapters of the book address foreseen objections to the “virtues as skill” thesis with special attention given to apt motivations and the role of practical wisdom. Finally, the last chapter of the book provides a reply to the situationist critique of virtue theory, i.e. the critique based on evidence allegedly proving that humans do not possess the robust character traits required for virtue theory to play a meaningful role explaining our behaviour. The arguments in these chapters are persuasive, and Stichter displays admirable judgment weaving a path through the complex, interdisciplinary material at stake. Thus, in my contribution I will not be aiming to provide any devastating critique of material in the book. Instead,
* Scott Woodcock [email protected]
1
Department of Philosophy, University of Victoria, PO Box 3045, STN CSC, Victoria, BC V8W 3P4, Canada
S. Woodcock
my plan is to identify three interesting features of the book that could benefit from further clarification. For all three features I think Stichter can address my requests for clarification via friendly amendments. Thus, nothing I propose jeopardizes his principal “virtue as skill” thesis. Nevertheless, I am curious to see if he will accept my proposals, since most of those commit
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