Two-state solution to the lottery paradox
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox Artu¯rs Logins1
Ó Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract This paper elaborates a new solution to the lottery paradox, according to which the paradox arises only when we lump together two distinct states of being confident that p under one general label of ‘belief that p’. The two-state conjecture is defended on the basis of some recent work on gradable adjectives. The conjecture is supported by independent considerations from the impossibility of constructing the lottery paradox both for risk-tolerating states such as being afraid, hoping or hypothesizing, and for risk-averse, certainty-like states. The new proposal is compared to views within the increasingly popular debate opposing dualists to reductionists with respect to the relation between belief and degrees of belief. Keywords The lottery paradox Epistemic justification Closure Emotions Justified belief Confidence Gradable adjectives Paradox Lockean thesis Belief Knowledge Certainty Risky states Absolute adjectives Credences Dualism about belief Reductionism about belief
1 Introduction Most of the existing reactions to the Lottery Paradox are revisionist with respect to epistemic justification. Typically, philosophers either suggest that epistemic justification is not closed under conjunction, or propose that high evidential probability alone is not sufficient for epistemic justification. Any of these proposals comes with certain theoretical costs, since both of the underlying principles (i.e. & Artu¯rs Logins [email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy and Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
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conjunction, and high evidential probability being connected to justification) are prima facie appealing. The goal of the present paper is to suggest a new analysis of the source of the paradox. In a nutshell, it will be argued that the problem lies not within some perceived general aspect of epistemic justification, but rather that the paradox arises specifically because of a confusion about belief. More specifically still I will suggest that the paradox arises only when we lump together two distinct possible states of being confident that p, under one general label of ‘belief that p’. One of these states is more demanding than the other. One corresponds, roughly, to being maximally confident that p, the other to being somewhat confident that p. More precisely still, these ‘two states’ correspond to two distinct ways of how the relevant inherent standards for being confident may be met: by having maximal confidence or by having some confidence. Given this more fine-grained distinction, the paradox disappears since these two distinct states of being confident that p differ with respect to which underlying principles they are supposed to comply with. Conjunction holds for the more demanding one, but not for the relaxed one. And, while one may be justified in being somewhat confident that a lottery ticket is a loser (given the statis
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