Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain An Examination of the (I
This book deals with 20 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid five important paradoxes in a restricted domain, viz., when
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Dan S. Felsenthal Hannu Nurmi
Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes 123
SpringerBriefs in Economics
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/8876
Dan S. Felsenthal Hannu Nurmi •
Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes
123
Dan S. Felsenthal
Hannu Nurmi Department of Philosophy, Contemporary History and Political Science University of Turku Turku, Finland
ISSN 2191-5504 ISSN 2191-5512 (electronic) SpringerBriefs in Economics ISBN 978-3-030-12626-1 ISBN 978-3-030-12627-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019933905 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface
Voting paradoxes are a fascinating subject. Like all paradoxes, they are likely to invoke suspicion and disbelief; things that are supposed to work in an orderly, predictable and ‘nice’ fashion yield surprising, counterintuitive, and ‘nasty’ outcomes. Voting paradoxes have the distinction among the other paradoxes that they are related to man-made institutions. Hence, one would expect that they can be avoided by suitable re-drafting of institutions. It turns out, unfortunately, that basically all voting institutions are plagued with some paradoxes. Hence, the choice between voting procedures is a kind of balancing act where an effort to avoid certain types of paradoxes leads to the choice of procedures that are associated with other kinds of paradoxes. In th
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