Well-Being and Experience
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Well‑Being and Experience Alan H. Goldman1 Received: 28 January 2020 / Accepted: 8 September 2020 © Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Robert Nozick argued that we would not plug into his machine that could give us any experiences we chose. More recently Richard Kraut has argued that it would be prudentially rational to plug into the machine, since only experiences count for personal welfare. I argue that both are wrong, that either choice can be rational or not, depending on the central desires of the subjects choosing. This claim is supported by the empirical evidence, which shows an almost even split between those who would enter and those who would not. If we interpret those on both sides as making rational choices to maximize their personal well-being, and if such rational choice tends to enhance well-being, then the experience machine thought experiment supports neither experientialism nor its denial, but instead a rational desire satisfaction account of personal well-being. Unlike objective list and perfectionist accounts, the desire satisfaction account of well-being easily accommodates rational choices on both sides, depending on the motivational sets of the choosers. Keywords Nozick · Kraut · Experience machine · Well-being
1 Introduction Infamously, Robert Nozick used the thought experiment of his experience machine to argue that more than experience matters to us (Nozick 1974, 1989). He assumed that, since we want to be in touch with the real world, we would not plug into the machine that could provide any experiences we chose. We want to actually do certain things, to make real choices, to be certain kinds of persons, and to relate to other real people. As we shall see, it is somewhat controversial whether “matters to us” is equivalent to “affects our personal welfare or well-being,” but the equation is initially plausible here. Nozick held that, because of these concerns, we would not plug into his machine for life, even though it would seem to us inside the machine that we would be leading perfect lives. Nozick assumes that we all have * Alan H. Goldman [email protected] 1
Department of Philosophy, College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, USA
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these extra-experiential concerns, and other things equal (to be specified below), we would not trade their satisfaction for experiences, no matter how pleasant. Given these concerns, it would be prudentially irrational for people like us to do so. Experientialists about well-being, unlike Nozick, hold that the best experience makes for the best life for the person living it. Quality of life depends only on quality of experience. In his recent book, Richard Kraut, following other experientialists regarding well-being, has argued against Nozick that it would be prudentially rational to plug into the experience machine (Kraut 2018). If prudential rationality aims at optimizing one’s personal well-being, it is always prudentially rational to seek the best experiences one can have, and this is what Nozick’s machine provides
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