Whataboutisms and Inconsistency
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Whataboutisms and Inconsistency Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia1
© Springer Nature B.V. 2020
Abstract Despite being very common in both public and private argumentation, accusations of selective application of general premises, also known as “whataboutisms”, have been mostly overlooked in argumentation studies, where they are, at most, taken as accusations of inconsistency. Here I will defend an account according to which allegations of this sort can express the suspicion that the argumentation put forward by one party does not reflect his or her actual standpoint and reasons. Distinguishing this kind of argumentative moves is important for evaluating its appropriateness in critical discussions where knowing the honest opinion of arguers is relevant, as in political controversies or interpersonal communication. Keywords Whataboutism · Fallacies · Tu quoque · Hypocrisy · Inconsistency · Suspicion
1 Introduction It is not unusual for a critic to attack an arguer by pointing out that they have failed to remain consistent about their motives in similar circumstances. For example, there is an inconsistency with someone expressing their sympathy for the survivors of a horrible tragedy in Europe, considering that the previous year, the same person disregarded a similar tragedy happening in Central America or Africa. Or, similarly, someone refusing to spend Christmas with his or her family-in-law, arguing that Christmas is not an important festivity, considering that the previous year the same person requested to spend Christmas with his or her own family. When this happens, the antagonist might accuse the protagonist of being inconsistent because the protagonist seems to be saying or doing something that contradicts what he or she had previously said or done. In this paper, I will argue that, in many cases, this is not what is centrally at stake in this sort of argumentative situations. Regardless of the * Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia [email protected] 1
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Circuito Mario de la Cueva s/n, Ciudad Universitaria, 04500 Mexico City, Mexico
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antagonist pointing at an inconsistency, that is not the main point of the argumentative move. I will defend an account according to which at least some of these maneuvers express the suspicion that the argumentation put forward by the arguer does not reflect his actual position or reasons. In these cases, the inconsistency is not the main problem, but the absence of an honest position on the protagonist’s side. If the inconsistency were the main issue, the problem would be solved by the protagonist becoming consistent, but in situations like the previous examples, that would not be enough. Denouncing the inconsistency is just a means to expose the absence of honesty in the protagonist’s argumentation. Distinguishing this kind of argumentative maneuvers from mere accusations of inconsistency is important because there are many argumentative sit
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