Why Monogamy is Morally Permissible: A Defense of Some Common Justifications for Monogamy
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Why Monogamy is Morally Permissible: A Defense of Some Common Justifications for Monogamy Kyle York1
© Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Abstract Harry Chalmers argues that monogamy involves restricting one’s partner’s access to goods in a morally troubling way that is analogous to an agreement between partners to have no additional friends. Chalmers finds the traditional defenses of monogamy wanting, since they would also justify a friendship-restricting agreement. I show why three traditional defenses of monogamy hold up quite well and why they don’t, for the most part, also justify friendship-restricting agreements (and why it doesn’t seem to matter when they do). In many cases, monogamy can be justified on grounds of practicality, specialness, or jealousy.
1 Introduction There have been many assumptions in the philosophy of love and sex, not to mention popular culture, that monogamy is the only possible form of romantic love or at least the most ethical sexual and romantic practice.1 A growing body of literature has been calling these assumptions into question.2 Some arguments go further and claim that monogamy or some of its components are immoral.3 I will be focusing here on one such argument about monogamy (or, more precisely, monogamous agreements) by Harry Chalmers.4 Providing an initial pushback to Chalmers’ points, I will conclude that, though non-monogamy may be fine, Chalmers’ argument is lacking and hasn’t shown monogamous agreements to be morally troublesome. 1
For examples, see Carrie Jenkins, “Modal Monogamy,” Ergo, Vol. 2, No. 8, (2015). E.g. Jenkins (ibid); Raja Halwani, Virtuous Liaisons, (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2003); and Elizabeth Emens, "Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence," University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper, No. 58, (2004). 3 E.g. John McMurty, “Monogamy: A Critique,” The Monist, Vol. 56, No. 4, (1972): 587-599; and Hallie Liberto, "The Problem with Sexual Promises," Ethics 127, no. 2 (January 2017), pp. 383-414. 4 Harry Chalmers, “Is Monogamy Morally Permissible?” Journal of Value Inquiry Vol. 53, No. 2, (2018), pp. 225-241. 2
* Kyle York [email protected] 1
Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
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K. York
Chalmers’ argument centers on an analogy between preventing one’s partner from having other friends and preventing her from having other lovers. Chalmers invites us to imagine partners who, have agreed on a most unusual restriction: Neither is allowed to have additional friends. Should either partner become friends with someone besides the other, the other partner will refuse to support it—indeed, will go so far as to withdraw her love, affection, and willingness to continue the relationship.5 Most would judge there to be something morally troubling about such a relationship. We should want the best for our lovers. This entails wanting them to have good things (such as friends) in their life, or at least wanting them to be free to pursue good things as they judge fit. As Chalmers writes, “part of
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