You Cannot Call Out the AA at 40,000ft
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You Cannot Call Out the AA at 40,000ft John C rocker Combat aircraft are expensive and so are their crew so no
This would allow the other 6 aircraft to perform
operator wants to lose either. The cureeni need to deploy large ground Jàrces to maintain and support them is also expensive and. potentiai/j hazardous. it i there bre not surprising thai the operators are looliing to the inanufa(turerr to produce aircraft so reliable 1/ial t/iej can go Ihr ; eekv without an maintenance. The question is, however, im! we achieve the
the lives at risk from enemy action and, often regarded as more important than any of the other
similar roles elsewhere or, ultimately to reduce the only a fraction of size of the airforce. It would considerations, it would significantly reduce the cost of the operation. ()r would it?
necessari level of reliahilil. with sufficient confidence, at an
There is no doubt that the marginal cost of this deployment would be significantly reduced but,
qifordable pdce, to meet this requirement?
nothing is for free. lo make an aircraft that can be
-00000-
operated for 1 50 hours over a 30 day period, say, without the need for any maintenance during that period is currently beyond our capabilines. lt is, iii fact, an impossibility. The best we could hope for is
\Ve all recognise that the post-war scenario, in which hundreds of aircraft wcre deployed on both sides of
the borders between the NATo and Eastern Bloc countries, has changed. h is fàr more likely that today's combat aircraft will deployed in relatively
that there will be a high, say 95°, probability of surviving such a period without the need for am
small numbers, in what seems like an ever increasing
(non-replenishment) maintenance.
number of trouble spots. to perform a 'peacekeeping' role possibly by bombing the hell out of anyone whom SC) much as threatens that peace.
Current situation
scenario poses a number of Based ri RAF figures, the lomado can expect lo sufThr 800 faults per 1000 aircraft flying hours. li is what equipment shotild accompany them, how not known how many of diese faults would stop the many personnel will be needed and what spares This new type
of
problems: how many aircraft should be deployed,
aircraft from flying or, indeed, how many would stop
should he taken. With the current aircraft, which it has to he admitted were not originally designed for this type of role, the answer to all of these questions is invariably, too many'.
it from performing the required missions.
Ii is
normal practice, in peacetime, at least, to rectify any reported faults as soon as possible so, in essence, we can assume that they are all ci'itical.
The ideal situation is to deploy only as many aircraft
At 800 faults per 1000 hours, we could expect to fly an average of 1 l//4 hours between fàults. If we now assume that the time between faults is exponentially
as needs he in the air at any one time. And, you make these aircraft and their various systems)
sufficiently reliable that they will never fail during their d
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