A deference model of epistemic authority
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A deference model of epistemic authority Sofia Ellinor Bokros1 Received: 8 May 2019 / Accepted: 24 August 2020 © The Author(s) 2020
Abstract How should we adjust our beliefs in light of the testimony of those who are in a better epistemic position than ourselves, such as experts and other epistemic superiors? In this paper, I develop and defend a deference model of epistemic authority. The paper attempts to resolve the debate between the preemption view and the total evidence view of epistemic authority by taking an accuracy-first approach to the issue of how we should respond to authoritative and expert testimony. I argue that when we look at the debate through the lens of accuracy, it becomes clear that matters are more complicated than either the preemption view or the total evidence view are able to account for. Consequently, a deference model, outlined within a credence-based framework, does a better job of capturing the relevant phenomena, and explaining how we should update our beliefs in response to epistemically authoritative testimony. Keywords Epistemic authority · Deference · Preemption · Expertise · Testimony · Accuracy first
1 Introduction How should we respond to the testimony of experts, advisors, and more generally those who we consider to be in a better epistemic position than ourselves? In the recent philosophical literature on epistemic authority and expert testimony, we find two competing answers to this question. According to the preemption view, we should completely defer to the testimony of those who are more knowledgeable than ourselves. Zagzebski (2012, 2013, 2016) has defended an influential account on which recognising somebody as an epistemic authority provides one with a preemptive reason to adopt their belief as one’s own. In the words of Zagzebski, “[t]he fact that the authority has a belief p is a reason for me to believe p that replaces my other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply
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Sofia Ellinor Bokros [email protected] CONCEPT, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
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added to them” (2013, p. 298). That is, instead of believing that p on the basis of one’s own reasons, when confronted with an epistemic authority, one is according to the preemptive account rationally required to adopt their belief on the basis of their epistemic authority. Preemptive views of epistemic authority have also been discussed and defended by Keren (2007, 2014a, b) and Constantin and Grundmann (2018). The alternative view holds that, instead of constituting a preemptive reason, the authority’s testimony simply provides an additional reason upon which one can base one’s belief that p. On this view, one’s belief that p should be based on the total evidence that one possesses oneself, instead of being based solely on the belief of the authority. In other words, no matter how strong the authoritative reason might be, it should not replace or preempt the reasons that one already has for or against believing that p. As put by Jennifer Lackey, “the testimony of experts
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