A Theory of Epistemic Justification
This book proposes an original theory of epistemic justification that offers a new way to relate justification to the epistemic goal of truth-conducive belief. The theory is based on a novel analysis of reliable belief-formation that answers classic objec
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PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES VOLUME 112
Founded by Wilfrid S. Sellars and Keith Lehrer Editor Stephen Hetherington, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia Senior Advisory Editor Keith Lehrer, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, U.S.A. Associate Editor Stewart Cohen, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, U.S.A. Board of Consulting Editors Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA U.S.A. Radu Bogdan, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, U.S.A. Marian David, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, U.S.A. John M. Fischer, University of California, Riverside, CA, U.S.A. Allan Gibbard, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, U.S.A. Denise Meyerson, Macquarie University, NSW, Australia François Recanati, Institut Jean-Nicod, EHESS, Paris, France Mark Sainsbury, University of Texas, Austin, TX, U.S.A. Stuart Silvers, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, U.S.A. Barry Smith, State University of New York, Buffalo, NY, U.S.A. Nicholas D. Smith, Lewis & Clark College, Portland, OR, U.S.A. Linda Zagzebski, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, U.S.A.
For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/6459
Jarrett Leplin
A Theory of Epistemic Justification
123
Dr. Jarrett Leplin 5623 Brisbane Drive Chapel Hill NC 27514 USA [email protected]
ISBN 978-1-4020-9566-5
e-ISBN 978-1-4020-9567-2
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-9567-2 Library of Congress Control Number: 2008941179 c Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 springer.com
Preface
One goal of epistemology is to refute the skeptic. Another, with an equally distinguished if briefer pedigree, is to make sense of science as a knowledge-acquiring enterprise. The goals are incompatible, in that the latter presupposes that the skeptic is wrong. The incompatibility is not strict. One could have both goals, conditioning the latter upon success at the former. In fact, however, epistemologies aimed at the skeptic tend not to get anywhere near science. They’ve got all they can handle figuring out how we can know we have hands. I come to epistemology from the philosophy of science, my original interest in which was epistemological. Philosophers of science are concerned with epistemic justification, but their question about it is how far it extends. They take justification to be unproblematic at the level of ordinary experience; their worries begin with the interpretation of experience as evidence for theory. They are interested in the scope of scientific knowledge. Having taken a position on this question (1997), arguing that justification extends to theoretical hypotheses, I came to wonder about the nature
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