A diachronic perspective on peer disagreement in veritistic social epistemology
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A diachronic perspective on peer disagreement in veritistic social epistemology Erik J. Olsson1 Received: 12 June 2015 / Accepted: 5 September 2018 © The Author(s) 2018
Abstract The main issue in the epistemology of peer disagreement is whether known disagreement among those who are in symmetrical epistemic positions undermines the rationality of their maintaining their respective views. Douven and Kelp have argued convincingly that this problem is best understood as being about how to respond to peer disagreement repeatedly over time, and that this diachronic issue can be best approached through computer simulation. However, Douven and Kelp’s favored simulation framework cannot naturally handle Christensen’s famous Mental Math example. As a remedy, I introduce an alternative (Bayesian) simulation framework, Laputa, inspired by Alvin Goldman’s seminal work on veritistic social epistemology. I show that Christensen’s conciliatory response, reasonably reconstructed and supplemented, gives rise to an increase in epistemic (veritistic) value only if the peers continue to recheck their mental math; else the peers might as well be steadfast. On a meta-level, the study illustrates the power of Goldman’s approach when combined with simulation techniques for handling the computational issues involved. Keywords Peer disagreement · Social epistemology · Truth · Computer simulation · Bayesian · Alvin I. Goldman
1 Introduction Two individuals are epistemic peers with respect to some question if and only if they are equals with respect to (1) their familiarity with the evidence and arguments which bear on that question and (2) general epistemic virtues such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom from bias (Kelly 2006, p. 175). Peer disagreement happens when two individuals who are peers with respect to the question at hand disagree about the
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Erik J. Olsson [email protected] Department of Philosophy, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
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Synthese
answer to the question. The disagreement becomes known when the peers disclose their diverging views to each other. Plausible cases of known peer disagreement include examples from law and science, such as when the Supreme Court is divided in a difficult legal case or when distinguished professors in paleontology disagree about what killed the dinosaurs. In politics, issues about the legalization of drugs have been mentioned in this connection because “[i]ntelligent, well-informed, well-meaning, seemingly reasonable people have markedly different views on this topic” (Feldman 2006, p. 218), and of course philosophy is the area of known peer disagreement par excellence. The main issue in the epistemology of peer disagreement is, in Thomas Kelly’s words, “whether known disagreement among those who are epistemic peers in this sense must inevitably undermine the rationality of their maintaining their respective views” (Kelly 2006, p. 175). There are, as one can imagine, two main answers to this question: yes, known peer disagreement does undermine the rationality of the r
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